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ABSTRACT

ENHANCING THE TIMING
OF THE ASSET ALLOCATION PROCESS
MAY 1990

JOONG-SOO NAM, B.B.A., SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, KOREA
M.B.A., DUKE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by: Professor Ben Branch

Much of previous research in finance has concentrated on explaining movements
of individual securities rather than on explaining movements in the stock market
as a whole. Although the available data are more limited than those for individual
stocks, the movements in the stock market as a whole are extremely important for
movements in individual stocks.

Indeed, market events of the past ten years have

sparked an interest in tactical asset allocation. The turbulence of October 1987 has
only accelerated this interest.
This study seeks to develop a methodology that systematically incorporates cur¬
rently available information into the tactical asset allocation process. The goal of this
study is not to predict individual stock prices, or every small movement in the market.
Rather we would like to use the currently available data to provide the investor with
an estimate of the probabilities associated with the broad measure of either a “bullish”
or “bearish” market period. Logit analysis is used to determine which of the various
timely and readily available data significantly affect the probabilities of “bullish

vi

and

“bearish” market months. We use the estimated probabilities generated by the logit
analysis to suggest the optimal allocation of funds between the risk-free asset and the
market portfolio and compare several timing strategies with a buy-and-hold strategy.
An Asset allocation strategy based on the probabilities assigned by the logit model
outperformed a buy-and-hold strategy by achieving a greater terminal wealth with
less variability of returns.

We also find that one who used our model would have

reduced downside risk and improved average performance over past cycles.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The investment performance of a managed portfolio depends primarily on the
manager’s ability in three areas:

(1) selectivity - forecasts of price movements of

selected individual stocks (i.e.“microforecasting”), (2) market timing - forecasts of
price movements of the general stock market as a whole (i.e.“macroforecasting”),1
and (3) cost and efficiency -comprehensive cost/benefit analysis of these management
activities.2

Usually associated with security analysis, microforecasting involves the

identification of individual stocks which are under- or overvalued relative to equities
generally.

Macroforecasting refers to forecasts of future realizations of the market

portfolio.

If an investment manager believes that he (or she)3 can forecast market

portfolio returns better than the average participant, he will adjust his portfolio risk
level in anticipation of market movements. If successful, he will earn abnormal returns
relative to an appropriate benchmark.
Much of the previous research in finance has concentrated on explaining move¬
ments of individual securities rather than on explaining movements in the stock mar¬
ket as a whole.4

One reason for this concentration of effort is that we have vast

1Fama[51]
2Most literature on investing deals with what (1) and when (2) to trade. How to trade at the
lowest costs (3) is often ignored or only briefly treated [See Loeb[109]].
3Here in after the investor will, for the sake of convenience, be assumed to be male
4See Treynorand Black[154], Treynor [152], Sharpe [140], and Jensen [90,91]. Jensen [92] provides
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amounts of data on individual firms, but we have only one stock market as a whole.
Although the available data are more limited than those for individual stocks, the
movements in the stock market as a whole are extremely important for movements in
individual stocks.* * * * 5 Indeed, market events of the past ten years have sparked an inter¬
est in tactical asset allocation.6 The turbulence of October 1987 (the disappointing
results of portfolio insurance during the Oct. 19, 1987 market crash and the awareness
that asset allocation may add value) has only accelerated this interest.7
a summary of the empirical studies about microforecasting. Umstead [157] undertakes investigation
of aggregate quarterly stock market prices. Variance bounds literature asks whether prices vary too
much to be explained only by changes in expected cash flows [Leroy and Porter [106], Shiller [145],
Grossman and Shiller [142]]. Some studies show that prices are predictable based on mean reverting
[Poterba and Summers [127], Fama and French [54,56], Campbell and Shiller [27]].
5The statisticians need large numbers of price changes or returns as raw material for their tests.
The number of usable separate 10-year or even 5-year return intervals in the data base are insufficient
to constitute the statistical equivalence of a quorum. Technical innovation did occur in the early
1980’s, however, in the form of procedures that would work with “overlapping” intervals and thus
greatly enlarge the usable sample of long-period returns.
definitions of the differences among tactical asset allocators, or between allocators and market
timers, are as numerous as the firms claiming those designations. Tactical asset allocation (TAA)
assumes that an investor can recognize and take advantage of the cyclical nature of financial markets,
but it shares with strategic asset allocation the assumption that fundamental valuation relationships
between asset classes hold over time.

That is, the returns available in the market may be above

or below “normal” levels at any point in time, but they will tend to revert to their norms over
time. Market timers attempt to predict equity market peaks and troughs, using quantitative models
with indicators such as market momentum, sentiment, price and monetary and economic conditions.
Phillips [124] suggests that the differences between TAA and market timing can be characterized by
five key dimensions. (1) Time frame: Market timing focus on the future. TAA focuses on current
asset values. (2) Objective: The objective of a market timer is to maximize return. TAA is concerned
with both risk and return. (3) Approach: The purpose of market timing is to capture market trends
and move in or out of the market in anticipation of the trend. Although TAA recognizes cyclical
trends in financial markets, the only prediction involved is that prices will adjust to bring returns to
an equilibrium level established by the risk levels of the asset classes over the long term. (4) Decision:
The market timer’s decision ultimately comes down to whether to be in or out of equities. The TAA
decision is one of balancing asset classes, based on valuations and the constraints of the strategic
plan.

(5) Performance measurement: The market timer tries to outperform the equity market on

a quarterly and annual basis.

The TAA manager tries to outperform a global multi-asset-class

portfolio.

7Pension & Investment Age report that tactical asset allocation managers had $38,374 billion
under management in the product, an increase in late 1988 of 41% from 1987 summer [Table 1.1].
The managers also gained 138 pension fund clients during the 12 months ended Aug. 30, bringing
the total number of TAA clients to 838[Pension & Investment Age (Sep.

5, 1988)].

But many

allocators underperformed in 1987 - until the crash made them look good. TAA appears to have

2

Table 1.1

Largest Tactical Asset Allocation Managers

FIRM

AMOUNT ($ mils.)

Wells Fargo

9,127

Prudential

7,100

Mellon Capital

6,000

First Chicago

4,500

TSA

3,000

Boston Co.

2.300

Renaissance

1,510

Avatar

1.300

Citibank

1,250

Bankers Trust

1,050

J.P. Morgan

500

Chase Investors

300

Bailard Beihl & Kaiser

200

Matrix

187

Webster

50

TOTAL

38,374

SOURCE

Pension & Investment Age
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This study seeks to develop a methodology that systematically incorporates cur¬
rently available information into the tactical asset allocation process. The results of
this procedure are then tested and evaluated.
First, logit analysis is used to help determine which of the various current sets of
information affect the probabilities of risk environments. Second, those probabilities
are employed to indicate the amounts of funds to be allocated to the risk-free asset and
to the market portfolio of risky assets. Finally, we compare several timing strategies
with a buy-and-hold strategy.

The comparison is based on end-of-period wealth

computation, risk and return measurements.
Chapter 2 evaluates the literature of market timing. In chapter 3, likely candidate
variables are selected on the basis of sound theory.

Such variables are expected to

influence the risk environment of the stock market. In chapter 4, we introduce the data
and explain the techniques. Chapter 5 discusses how to construct and validate our
model. In chapter 6, several strategies are specified and empirical results are reported.
Finally, a summary and directions for future research are explored in chapter 7.

worked in 1987 and failed in 1988 [WSJ (May 16, 1989)].
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The theoretical justification for asset allocation as a portfolio management strategy
stems from the Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT). Selected literature related to the
development of MPT is presented to provide the necessary background for the asset
allocation strategy.

Theoretical and empirical studies of performance evaluation of

market timings are reviewed.

Asset allocation techniques currently being used by

practitioners are also examined.

2.1

Modern Portfolio Theory
The asset allocation decision is an integral part of the portfolio management

process. The evaluation of portfolio management performance requires a structural
specification within which superior performance, if it exists, can be identified. Modern
Portfolio Theory provides a measure of performance in the framework of the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). A key contribution to MPT is the assumption that
portfolios can be selected on the basis of expected return and risk. A major work in
the area of the measurement of risk is the article of Markowitz [111]. He provided
investors with the concept of the interrelationship (covariance) among individual asset
holdings and thus emphasized the importance of all the investor’s holdings in the

5

portfolio format. The efficient set of portfolios is comprised of those portfolios that
offer the maximum expected return for a given level of risk.

Risk is measured by

the variance of the portfolio returns. However, the determination of the efficient set
of portfolios requires the computation of all of the possible variance and covariance
terms. The number of covariance calculations can be extensive. If N securities are
analyzed, the variance-covariance matrix will have (1/2)(N-1)N different covariance
elements. In his 1959 article, Markowitz demonstrated that the investor’s portfolio
decision problem could be stated in the form of a quadratic programming problem.
The decision variable of the quadratic programming problem was shown to be the
percentage to invest in a risky asset which minimizes variance subject to an expected
return constraint.
Papers following the Markowitz article further refined the development of measures
of risk, return, and efficient sets of portfolios.

Sharpe [139] extended the concepts

of Markowitz [111], Tobin [151], Hicks [85] into a market equilibrium theory of asset
prices under conditions of risk.

Sharpe describes the optimal investment policy for

the individual by detailing an investment opportunity curve of risky assets and the
linear efficient set of investments resulting from the introduction of a riskless asset in
combination with a portfolio of risky assets. He demonstrates that all investors will
choose to hold some combination of the risk-free asset and the market portfolio of
risky assets (two-fund separation).
Sharpe extends the analysis to what is known as the CAPM by showing that the
relevant risk measure of the individual asset is the covariance between returns of the
risky asset and the market portfolio divided by the variance of the market portfolio.
This risk measure, termed (3, is the risk of the economy as a whole and is therefore
undiversifiable. In equilibrium, every individual asset must be priced so that its
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risk-adjusted rate of return falls exactly on a straight line known as the Security
Market Line.
MPT provides the basis for the asset allocation decision through the concepts of
the capital market line, the market portfolio, the two-fund separation theory, and the
theory of utility maximization. Relevant measures of performance for the portfolio
and the individual asset are described within the framework of MPT and provide
investors with an objective criterion for selecting assets.

2.2

Measuring Timing Performance

Using the tools of MPT, the investment manager seeks to create a portfolio that of¬
fers the highest expected return in relation to risk. The process can be dichotomized
into the activities of stock selection and asset allocation.

Stock selection involves

forecasting price movements of individual stocks (microforecasting). The investment
manager attempts to identify those individual stocks whose expected returns lie ei¬
ther significantly above or below the Security Market Line.

The microforecaster is

concerned with forecasting the nonsystematic (company-specific) component of the
return on an individual stock.

Given a specific portfolio, microforecasting can be

a valuable tool in improving its performance.

However, this technique is portfolio

specific, i.e., its results cannot be generalized so as to apply to any portfolio since
different portfolios incorporate different stocks having different returns.
The asset allocation decision is an attempt by the portfolio manager to forecast
when the portfolio of risky assets will outperform the risk-free asset or when the risk¬
free asset will outperform the portfolio of risky assets (macroforecasting), assuming
that the investment alternatives are limited to those two asset classes. The concept
of macroforecasting implies a relationship between future states of the market and
currently available information.

7

Fama [51] showed that security selection and market timing performances are
additive if the intended beta is assumed to be equal to the actual beta. When the
market timing performance measure is added to Jensen’s selectivity index, we arrive
at the risk premium of the portfolio. Fama refers to this overall risk premium as total
performance.

Rp - Rf

=

[Rp - Rf - {Rm - Rf)(3P\

+

(Rm - Rf)/3P

Total perf ormance

=

Security selection

-f

Market timing

This relationship provides a basis for measuring the security selection and market
timing abilities of the portfolio manager simultaneously. To be meaningful, this de¬
composition of total performance requires that the manager be responsible for both
security selection and market timing decisions.
The role of the CAPM in investment performance evaluation has been widely
debated in the finance literature. Roll [134] has argued that the CAPM cannot be
used to produce unambiguous rankings of investment performance. His objection is
based on several considerations. First, the market portfolio is not uniquely defined
in the theory. Whether this portfolio should consist of only equities, all marketable
securities or all assets, marketable or not is not clear.

Second, he showed that if a

proxy for the market portfolio is used, an alternative proxy can always be constructed
that would give exactly the reverse ranking of performances. Third, he showed that
if the “true” market portfolio is found and the CAPM is correct then no portfolio can
show superior or inferior performance.
Myers and Rice [114] have demonstrated that as long as information relevant to
security valuation is not distributed evenly across all groups of investors, then the
CAPM can identify superior or inferior performance.

Dybvig and Ross [43,44] fur¬

ther clarified the circumstances under which the CAPM framework can be used for
performance evaluation. They agree with Roll that, in the absence of consistent infor-
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mation asymmetries, CAPM based performance evaluation measures are ambiguous.
They also agree with Mayer and Rice that, in the presence of superior information not
generally available, CAPM based performance measures can give reliable evaluations.
In generalizing some of the findings in the Dydvig and Ross [44] paper, Green [79]
showed that the robustness of the SML paradigm is weakened considerably if the mar¬
ket return proxy is not mean-variance efficient. Errors in measuring the benchmark
market portfolio are shown to be directly related to the deviations of individual asset
and inefficiently diversified portfolios from the SML.1 Green shows that the ranking
of two investments using the SML based methodology can be reversed by changing
the proxy used to measure the market portfolio.

Therefore, even on a theoretical

basis, a number of important research papers have questioned the usefulness of the
CAPM framework for evaluating investment performance.
Connor and Korajczyk [36] have provided a new theory and methodology for eval¬
uating portfolio performance using a competitive equilibrium version of the Arbitrage
Pricing Theory (APT). Performance criteria analogous to Jensen’s abnormal returns
measure and the Treynor-Black risk adjusted return measure are developed and con¬
sistent estimators derived. The APT framework developed by Connor and Korajczyk
produces meaningful performance measures as long as the market is assumed to con¬
sist of both informed and uninformed investors. The APT measures which are derived
assume that the investors or fund managers do not engage in market timing activi¬
ties. Therefore, while the APT model has been shown to be a useful framework for
assessing the security selection skills of managers, further developments are needed
so that timing activities can also be evaluated.
1The source of this measurement error is unobserved shifts in portfolio composition that results
in a nonnormal unconditional distribution of returns. Kane and Marks [96] consider whether such a
measurement error is likely to occur in practice by developing the exact condition under which the
Sharpe measure will fail to order timers according to ability. They show that the Sharpe measure is
in fact likely to be deficient under actual market conditions, given the current industry practice of
using quarterly data to evaluate portfolio managers.
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A number of empirical methods have been developed to explore whether managers
have regularly engaged in timing activities and if so, the extent to which their efforts
have been successful. Treynor and Mazuy [155] first looked for evidence of macrofore¬
casting skills by analyzing return data on mutual funds. A number of papers have
examined the intertemporal stability of mutual fund betas, thereby indirectly consid¬
ering the topic of market timing. Jensen [91], Campanella [24] and Pogue and Conway
[126] investigated the stability of fund betas by correlating estimates in different time
periods.
Kon and Jen [103] applied a considerably more rigorous framework to the analysis
of the timing activities of mutual fund managers. They find significant shortcomings
when the standard ordinary least-squares technique is applied to the market timing
problem. The technique which Kon and Jen employ is switching regression analysis.
This approach does not require that the specific times at which the manager changes
the volatility of the portfolio be prespecified.

The other model assumes that such

switches, if they are made at all, are made at the beginning of the prespecified bull
and bear markets.

Kon and Jen’s approach, however, does arbitrarily assume the

number of different risk regimes used by the manager.
In a later study, Kon [104] again used switching regression methods. The discrim¬
inant procedure enabled him to decide more accurately on the appropriate number
of risk regimes to assume for a given sample of historic returns data.

Aside from

the general issue of whether managers engaged in timing activities, Kon also evalu¬
ated the effectiveness of the timing activities of fund managers.

All of the studies

considered thus far rely on the Capital Asset Pricing Model framework.2
Merton [115] considered the question of market timing from an entirely new per¬
spective. His approach involves modeling the equilibrium value of market timing skills
2Specifically, they assume that stock returns are normally distributed and that relative to the
“public” information set, securities are priced so as to satisfy the SML.

10

using options. The approach requires that the market timer forecasts whether stocks
will beat bonds/T-bills as an investment medium for the coming period.

He then

described the value of perfect accuracy using a contingent claims framework.
Hendriksson and Merton [83] provided a sequel paper in which they added sta¬
tistical procedures to test for superior market timing skills within the framework de¬
veloped by Merton. Both parametric and non-parametric tests were presented. The
former requires knowledge of the probability distribution of stock returns. Because
of the difficulty in obtaining actual market forecasts of mutual fund managers, re¬
searchers have for the most part used the parametric test forms. Security returns are
commonly assumed to be described adequately by the CAPM. Therefore, as applied,
the Merton and Hendriksson tests remain CAPM based.
The ordinary least squares methods recommended by Hendriksson and Merton [83]
and later applied by Hendriksson [82] and Chang and Lewellen [31] are not, however,
free of conceptual problems. If fund managers actively manage their portfolios, they
are likely to adjust their risk levels continually in the midst of periods characterized by
bull and bear markets. The ordinary least squares method suggested by Hendriksson
and Merton assumes, however, that a fund’s portfolio beta is constant during any
particular bull or bear market and common across all bull or bear periods.
We reviewed the literature on the theory and techniques of evaluating the secu¬
rity selection index and market timing simultaneously. We observed that significant
advances have been made although problems persist. As Fama [51] pointed out, the
performance measures that are appropriate for a particular portfolio manager must
take into account the constraints under which he operates.

11

2.3

Macroforecasting

Empirical work in finance has traditionally concentrated on cross-sectional anal¬
ysis of asset returns. Several studies have, however, successfully used economic data
to predict stock market movements, thereby suggesting the feasibility of integrating
macroeconomic variables into the asset allocation decision.3 Umstead [157] undertook
an extensive statistical investigation of aggregate quarterly stock prices (the S&P 500
Composite Index) and their relationship to the National Bureau of Economic Re¬
search Leading Composite Index. Box-Jenkins methodology wTas utilized to build a
transfer function model relating changes in the leading economic index to subsequent
stock price changes. The model was verified by computing a “hit rate” of forecasts of
“up” and “down” markets. In addition, the accumulated wealth of a portfolio that
switched between equities and Treasury bills was compared to a buy-and-hold strat¬
egy. Defining “up” and “down” markets as returns above or below the median return,
Umstead’s model made thirty-two out of fifty correct forecasts. The Umstead study
suggested that readily available information contains enough predictive information
to be useful to the portfolio manager in making the asset allocation decision. Note,
however, that this effect is at least partially due to the fact that stock prices are one
of the series that make up the Leading Composite Index.
Manjr practitioners also asserted that combinations of publicly available informa¬
tion may be used to construct technical market indicators that help them assess the
market’s mood and thus forecast its direction.4

Some academicians found value in

the indicators,5 other studies failed to find technical stock market indicators helpful.6

3Umstead [157], and Piccini [125]
4Zweig [160,161]
5Branch [15]
6Daigler and Fielitz [38]
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Moreover, some studies suggested that the stock market leads certain market indica¬
tors (e.g., money supply).7
The efficient market hypothesis implies that predicting market returns is as diffi¬
cult as identifying undervalued or overvalued stocks using information that is readily
available to all investors. Moreover, a growing body of literature suggests that prices
deviate from value, and that such departures can be substantial and long-lasting.8
Modigliani and Cohn maintained, in 1979, that the stock market had been 50 per
cent undervalued for as long as a decade because of inflation illusion. The emergence
of a bull market after inflation subsided was consistent with their hypothesis.
Such significant and long-lasting departures from value run counter to conventional
theory. They are more in line with the perspectives of such market observers as Shiller,
who argues that “social movements, fashions or fads are likely to be important or even
the dominant cause of speculative asset price movements.”9 Moreover, Summers [149]
has pointed out that the whole litany of empirical tests supporting market efficiency
is also consistent with an alternative “fads” hypothesis; he takes issue with the notion
that market prices must represent rational assessments of fundamental value.

7If investors have altered their outlook in anticipation of a change in an indicator, the stock
market’s moves may lead (rather than be led by) those of the indicator. See Branch and Schneeweis
[18,19]
8The market has often appeared to depart widely from its underlying value.
three quarters of 1987, stocks outperformed bonds by 46.7 per cent.

During the first

Equilibrium was practically

restored in just one day - October 19. In the words of Summers, “If anyone did seriously believe that
price movements are determined by changes in information about economic fundamentals, they’ve
got to be disabused of that notion by Monday’s 500-point improvement.”

[WSJ(Oct.

23, 1987)]

While this particular market overvaluation was corrected quickly, mispricing can be longer lasting.
9Shiller does not totally dismiss rational expectations and the usefulness of fundamentals. In his
“Comments” in Hogarth and Reder [86], Shiller states, “I think the truth may well be that financial
prices can be successfully modeled as reflecting proper anticipations of those future movements in
dividends that can be predicted plus a term reflecting the anticipation of fashions or fads among
investors.”
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In the context of arguing that the stock market is inefficient because it is too
volatile, Shiller [145] documented wide departures of historical prices from theoretical
value. He cited these departures as evidence for the existence of fads.10 Fama and
French [56] found that dividend yields can explain over 25 per cent of the variance
in future two to four-year returns and suggested, as one possible explanation, that
prices behave whimsically in an irrational market.
Several studies, including those by DeBondt and Thaler [39] and Fama and French
[56], have documented long-run reversals in security prices, which seem to be due to
investor overreaction.11 DeBondt and Thaler [39] showed reversals lasting up to five
years, which occurred primarily in January. Fama and French [56] demonstrated that
up to 40 per cent of the variance of three to five year returns is a predictable reversal
of previous returns. Others, extending these findings, have generally concluded that
such reversals represent evidence of serious market inefficiency.12

10But Miller and McCormick [116] argue that the case for the existence of bubbles based on the
supposed excessive volatility of stock prices must be regarded as still unproved. The excess volatility
argument is presented and remains controversial. For a summary of the debate, see Camerer and
Weigelt [33]. Shiller [146] discusses departures from value, rather than excess volatility, as evidence
of fads in “Comments”.
nChan [29] claims that DeBondt and Thaler’s reversal effect is explained by changing risk: Stocks
suffering price declines become riskier, and this heightened risk explains their subsequent outperformance. However, Debondt and Thaler [40] demonstrate that losers subsequently have higher betas
in up markets and lower betas in down markets, and thus reject the changing-risk explanation.
12Poterba and Summers [127], O’Brien [119] and Richardson [132] argues that the seeming depar¬
tures from nonstationarity detected by the new procedures, properly calibrated may not really be
larger than what might plausibly be expected from pure chance alone. A recent paper by Kim, Nel¬
son and Startz [100] suggests that the transitory components may be reflecting nothing more than
the huge up-and-down swings imposed both on stock prices and the U.S. economy by the Great
Depression of the 1930’s. They find no substantial transitory components in the 40 year postwar
period 1946-1986.
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How can such “mispricing” persist in the face of “smart money”? Summers [149]
concluded that irrationality may be difficult to identify and risky to exploit, hence
irrational prices need not be eliminated in time. Black [13] has argued that trading by
those who do not possess useful information creates “noise”-that is, deviations of price
from value.13 These deviations induce information-based traders to enter the market,
but the time required for them to correct pricing errors caused by noise traders is
often measured in months or years. As evidence from economic theory, experimental
markets and the real world has indicated, learning, competition and arbitrage may
be insufficient to eliminate irrationality and market inefficiencies.14
Furthermore, institutional investors may be particularly susceptible to fads. Bern¬
stein [12] has suggested that value models move in and out of favor with portfolio
managers, based on their current effectiveness. Such “style” fads might affect prices.
Camerer and Weigelt [33] have maintained that the relative performance goal of pro¬
fessional money managers is conducive to price bubbles. Friedman [67] noted that the
professional investment community shares the same research sources and suggested
that the asymmetry of rewards in money management leads to “herd” opinions and
decisions. In a similar vein, Treynor [153] has demonstrated that “shared errors” can
decrease price accuracy.
The studies reviewed thus far have implied that readily available information may
be used (with some degree of success) to forecast stock market movements. A relevant
question to be considered is, “How superior must one’s predictions be to implement
a market timing style effectively?”

13French and Roll [64] found that a significant portion of market volatility is due to mispricing.
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers [41] maintained that noise traders cause prices to deviate so far from
fair value as to create serious consequences for society as a whole.
14Akelof and Yellen [1] demonstrated that small amounts of irrationality can have large economic
effects.
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2.4

Gains from Market Timing

Sharpe [141] showed that a timing strategy generates higher average returns and
less variability of those returns than a buy-and-hold portfolio. Describing the less than
perfect timing case, Sharpe indicates that at least a seventy percent accuracy rate in
timing the market is required to make the practice worthwhile.

Because achieving

a seventy percent accuracy rate is unlikely, Sharpe’s study suggests that portfolio
managers minimize trading and emphasize a buy-and-hold strateg)r. Sharp’s study,
while providing some insights into the effects of imperfect market timing ability on
investment performance, is limited in two respects. First, Sharpe assumed an investor
was equally successful at forecasting bull markets as bear markets. Second, Sharpe’s
conclusions were based on the arithmetic mean of the gains over and above the returns
from a passive buy-and-hold strategy.
Jeffrey [89] came to the same conclusion by observing that historically more years
had been average or poor than spectacular. Therefore, if a manager’s market timing
activities lead him to miss a few of these rare spectacular years, he would usually
have been better-off with a buy-and-hold strategy.
Chua and Woodward [33] used essentially the same framework employed by Sharpe,
but corrected for these two limitations. They tested the relative importance of hitting
the bull markets compared with avoiding the bear markets. They show that accuracy
in forecasting bull markets is the primary variable deciding whether timing will pay.
They also show that the interim returns that give the stock market its high average
return tend to occur infrequently and over a proportionately small number of periods.
This relationship helps explain why an investor engaged in market timing activities
has such difficulty beating a buy-and-hold strategy.15

15The buy-and-hold strategy can be viewed as a strategy that has a 100% accuracy in forecasting
bull markets and 0% accuracy in forecasting bear markets.
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Using more recent data and more realistic assumptions about both the frequency
of portfolio revisions and the level of transaction costs, Atchley and Ehrhardt [4] find
that only a moderate degree of forecasting skill (sixty percent accuracy) is required
to outperform the market.
Most recently, Clarke et al.

[34] show that a market timer who follows optimal

rules can expect higher returns and lower risk than a buy-and-hold stock investor.16
They also show that the returns on the market timer’s portfolio increases as the
level of information increases and that even modest amount of information can bring
substantial advantage.
with an

R2

For example, a model that predicts monthly stock returns

of 0.09 can be expected to give a market timer a 5.9 percent annual

return advantage over an investor who buys and hold stocks as presented in Table 2.1
without incurring transaction costs.17

2.5

Asset Allocation

Most of these studies imply that outperforming the market on a risk-adjusted basis
is not possible. They do, however, address the problem of developing a procedure that
is capable of achieving an acceptably accuracy rate in predicting market conditions.
Such a procedure should help investors determine the amount of funds to allocate to
either the risk-free asset or the market portfolio of risky assets.
Several techniques for making the asset allocation decision are currently available
to the portfolio manager. Previous asset allocation studies tend to utilize allocation
models with inputs of historical risk and return information and investor preference
16The expected return on the portfolio of a market timer is 21.4 percent, 5.9 percent higher than
the 15.5 return on stocks.

Moreover, the standard deviation of the returns of the market timers

portfolio is 17.2 percent, 3.3 percent lower than the standard deviation of the return of stocks.
[Figure 2.1]
17However, the 1.0 percent to transaction costs reduce the value added considerably, from 5.9
percent to 1.2 percent.
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Figure 2.1

The distribution of returns on a market timer’s portfolio
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Table 2.1

The Risk and Return of a Market Timer’s Portfolio

Correlation0

Value6

SDC

SD*

Value

e

0 %

.1 %

1.0 %t

0.0

0.0

20.5

20.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.0

20.5

19.4

0.5

0.2

0.0

0.2

0.0

20.3

17.9

3.0

2.4

0.1

0.3

0.2

19.6

17.2

5.9

5.5

1.2

0.4

0.5

18.8

16.6

9.3

8.8

3.4

0.5

1.1

18.1

16.3

13.0

11.9

6.4

0.6

1.7

17.3

15.8

16.2

15.6

9.5

0.7

2.4

16.6

15.6

19.4

19.2

12.9

0.8

3.2

15.9

15.2

23.2

22.6

16.8

0.9

4.0

15.3

14.8

27.3

26.4

20.0

1.0

4.6

14.7

14.3

31.3

30.7

23.4

“Correlation between a signal and stock returns
6Value added by the market timer, relative to a buy and hold stock portfolio where
switching is allowed only once a year
cStandard deviation where switching is allowed once a year
^Standard deviation where switching is allowed once a month
eValue added by the market timer, relative to a buy and hold stock portfolio where
switching is allowed once a month
^one way transactions costs
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constraints.

Such procedures begin by examining a series of historic returns, such

as the Ibbotson-Sinquerfield studies [87].

From these data, the portfolio manager

calculates returns and standard deviations over various time periods relying on the
premise that the historical relationships between risk and return will persist into the
future.

This approach is sensitive to the time period selected as a base.

Moreover

it depends upon the manager’s ability to use the historic returns by projecting the
future state of the economy.
Arnott and Germeten [2] presented a systematic approach to asset allocation.
They deduced which asset classes are particularly attractive in any market condition
by comparing the relative return estimates with “normal” relative returns.

They

found that normal relative returns amount to approximately two percent for long
bonds and five percent for equities. They concluded that when long bond yields are
more than two percent above cash yields, bonds subsequently do well and when the
yield differential falls below two percent, bonds tend to perform poorly.

They also

found that trends in the relative calculated returns are just as important as the return
calculations themselves.
Defining peak interest rates as the difference between cash returns and the latest
12-month percentage change in the Consumer Price Index, they found that the level
of real interest rates is related to subsequent change in interest rates. The 12-month
trailing rate of change in the Department of Commerce’s leading indicators was found
to be a valuable indicator for the relative returns of equities and bonds.

A rising

indicator was shown to favor equities over bonds; a falling indicator suggests the
opposite. They found that implementing their strategy pays off handsomely during
turbulent markets. The amount of asset deployment has a major impact on balanced
performance.

During the less turbulent years, asset allocation is less critical. Thus

only modest value is added during those times.

20

Fielitz and Muller [59] provided another approach to asset allocation.

For ease

of discussion, they assumed that the feasible investment environment is limited to
fixed income securities and equities. The asset allocation system is designed to as¬
sist the manager in assessing the trade-off between the expected return and risk of
the two alternative asset classes. They employed a simulation program called SIMR
which allows the investor to isolate the effects of the four input factors: risk, return,
time horizon, and utility preference. This study demonstrated the importance of the
multiscenario projection approach. The approach allows portfolio managers the op¬
portunity to investigate a range of outcomes and the sensitivity of the asset allocation
decision to the alternative input assumptions. They concluded with the importance of
using probability values by stating that the values can be used to establish a bound¬
ary within which strategic asset allocation decisions can be made.

They indicate

the importance of assigning probabilities to the various expected returns within the
portfolio.
Tilley and Latainer [156] showed that the asset allocation can dynamically be
adjusted in such a way as to replicate the returns on an option. Investing a portion
of the portfolio in a riskless asset (to guarantee a minimum return) and dynami¬
cally adjusting stock and bond positions (by borrowing from the cash position), can
eliminate all downside risk while maintaining upside potential. They linked option
pricing theory with traditional asset allocation by utilizing a special type of option a call option that gives its holder the right to purchase a full position in the better
performance of either stocks or bonds. Their solution to the asset allocation problem
suggests that the investor set aside enough wealth in a riskless asset to assure a mini¬
mum return target over the holding period and use the remaining wealth to purchase
these specialized calls. Although such options are not available in the market place
currently, their return pattern can be “synchronized” by a trading strategy utiliz-
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ing stocks, bonds and cash. They didn’t explicitly consider the question concerning
measurement of risk for such strategy. Since the payoff distribution of option based
strategy are nonnormal, variance is no longer an adequate measure of risk.

Future

research is required to determine the proper measure of risk for a strategy involving
options and a nonnormal payoff distribution.
Following the rapid development of the futures contracts on US stock indices
and Treasuries, Wall Street houses have written a substantial amount on the use
of the contracts in the asset allocation process.

The availability of the contracts

does not solve or alter the allocation problem, but provides more efficient means of
restructuring a portfolio. Once the decision is made to change the portfolio exposure
to the risk of a given asset class, futures contracts provide, in most circumstances,
the least expensive way to effect the change. Aside from tracking error between the
cash portfolio and the futures contracts, several problems remain.18
The studies reviewed thus far have reported some success in asset allocation.
These studies do not necessarily imply that an appropriate asset-mix is possible to
forecast over time. None the less, the activities of a significant portion of the asset
allocators coupled with the evidence suggesting that value is added by these activities
merits further academic research.

18First, the possibility that mispricing in the interest rate and stock index contracts do not cancel.
Excess returns to arbitrage on the S&P 500 index contract have been well-publicized recently. Excess
returns on the T-bond contract are imperfectly correlated with the S&P raising the possibility of
unanticipated loss or gain on the above strategy.
Second, rolling over the hedge as contracts expire incurs pricing risks.
Third, the possibility of cash outflow and lost interest income as contracts are marked to market
each day. And opportunities to use futures contracts outside the USA are currently limited.
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Tins study addresses this issue. It attempts to incorporate more information than
previously employed and to assign probabilities to future states of the stock market
in a more rigorous manner.*9

19Techr.lcal marke: models :rieu to forecast the changes in stock price using decision rules with
little or no theoretical justification. Data mining may produce indicators that seem to have some
period specific value but out of sample results are poor. Clarke et al.34 show that a model predicting
monthly stock returns with an correlation of 0.3 can be expected to give a market timer a 5.9 percent
1.2 percent with 1.0 percent transactions costs

annual return advantage over an investor who buys

and holds stocks. An overestimation of the true correlation might occur if correlations, estimated
based on past periods, do not persist into the future. A market timer who makes no allowance for
such misestimation will make suboptimai decisions. For example, the value added by the market
timer who has no information, but who overestimates his information as a correlation of 0.5, can
expect to lose 8 percent per year when the one-way transaction cost is 1.0 percent.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL
CONSIDERATIONS
The objective of this study is to develop a procedure to test the merit of using
probable states of the market as a guideline to asset allocation.

The procedure is

based on the concept that ex ante variables are related to the excess return.

The

objective is to identify the relationship and assign probabilities to expected future
states of capital markets. The investor must be able to decide at the beginning of an
investment period as to how he will allocate his funds across the various asset classes.
The existing literature (cited in Chapter Two) suggests that asset allocation has
experienced some success. An investment manager who has some information which
permits a forecast of market movements may anticipate a market return different
from the consensus expectation and will adjust his portfolio accordingly. When an
investor has information that other market participants do not have regarding the
probable future state of the stock market, the greater the confidence the investor has
in that information the greater his tendency to allocate funds based on that knowledge
(towards either the risk free asset or the portfolio of risky assets depending upon the
relative performance of the risk-free asset and the market portfolio). According to the
efficient market hypothesis, a managed portfolio would not be expected to outperform
the buy-and-hold strategy on a risk adjusted basis over the long run. However, in the
short run, any excess returns to a portfolio managed by a forecasting technique may
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indicate that, although the forecaster is using readily available public information,
the information is being processed into a form that is not being considered by all
market participants.

The implication of this process is, that as the data in that

particular form becomes available to all investors, excess returns resulting from the
use of that data will disappear. Recent studies demonstrating the likely existence of
price bubbles in stock prices (cited in Chapter 2), in conjunction with the article by
Clarke et al. [34] forms the basis for this timing of the asset allocation study.

3.1

Procedure

A three step procedure is used to integrate readily available variables into the as¬
set allocation process. The first step is to find ex ante observable variables which can
predict excess return. The second step involves the generation of state probabilities
from a logit analysis of the sample data. The goal is not to predict individual stock
prices, or every small movement in the market, but rather to use the currently avail¬
able data to provide the investor with an estimate of the probabilities associated with
the broad measure of either a “bullish” or “bearish” market period. Logit analysis is
used to determine which of the various timely and readily available data significantly
affect the probabilities of “bullish” and “bearish” market months. The final step of
the procedure is to use the estimated probabilities generated by the logit analysis to
suggest the optimal allocation of funds between the risk-free asset and the market
portfolio.

3.2

Determinants of the Excess Return
The expected rate of return of the stock market can be decomposed into two

components, namely, the return on a T-bill and equity risk premium (RPE). The RPE
reflects on an ex ante basis how much additional return investors are demanding as a

25

reward for taking on the additional risk of common stock ownership. An estimate of
RPZ oners ns a cine to the relative merits of investing in stocks versus the less risky
medium of T-bills. Xote. however, that we never really know ex ante what RPE is or
how

it is changing. At best we can estimate its size and direction of movement.

Here, we shall ask whether any ex ante observable variables reliably predict excess
return

Excess return can be written as follows:

ExcessReturn

=

T otal Return — RiskFreeReturn

ER,

=

P‘ - P‘-1 - D‘ _ TBt

(3.1)

M-l

This market excess return provides a measure of the attractiveness of stocks rel¬
ative to the risk-free rate.

Hence it offers a guideline for allocating assets between

stocks and cash.
Consider a discrete-time perfect-certainty model in which Dt, the dividend per
share for the time period from t-1 to t. grows at the constant rate g, and the market
interest rate that relates the stream of future dividends to the stock price Pf_x at
time t-1 is the constant k. In this model, the price Pt-1 is

Pt-1 =

1 + g + (.i±£l! + ,,.) =
1 + kK

1 + k

(1 + k)2

'

Dt

(3.2)

k — g

We can restate equation (3.1) into equation (3.3) using equation (3.2).
ERl =

AA/(*-g) + A _

TBt

(3.3)

Dt/{k - g)
While the form of equation (3.3) does not lend itself to empirical estimation, it
does provide the theoretical foundation for the hypothesis represented by equation
(34).1
1Much has been written on the performance of stocks stratified by PEs and another body of
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ER = f[k,g,D,TB}

3.2.1

(3.4)

Determinants of Appropriate Discount Rate

An investor’s required rate of return is determined by: (1) the economy’s risk-free
rate (RFR), sometimes referred to as the pure time value of money, (2) the expected
rate of price increase during the period of the investment, and (3) a risk premium for
common stocks that reflects investor uncertainty regarding future returns.
The ‘Teal” risk-free rate is generally considered to be a function of the “real”
growth rate of the economy, which in turn is determined by the growth of productivity.
The nominal RFR is the “real” RFR plus the expected rate of inflation during the
period. While the real RFR is difficult to derive, a reasonable proxy for the real RFR
is the yield on U.S. government securities. We use the U.S. government yield series
as a proxy for the nominal RFR and adjust it for the rate of inflation to derive an
estimate for the “real” RFR. Given the adjustment to derive an estimate of the “real”
RFR, we wish to consider whether the expected rate of inflation has any independent
impact.
literature seeks to explain the level of a firm’s PE ratio. The market PE has, in contrast, received
relatively little academic attention.
individual stocks.

Note, however, that the market is simply an aggregation of

Accordingly, equation (3.2) should be applicable to the total market. In fact,

equation (3.2) may be more suitably applied to the market as a whole than to individual stocks.
Errors in measuring inputs may well tend to cancel out in the aggregate.

That is, overestimates

of individual dividend forecasts are likely to be offset by underestimates. Thus the DDM can be
used to examine how the stock market is viewing the future. Branch [17] suggests that Dividend
Discount Model could have been helpful in the economic analysis of the overall stock market around
the time of the stock market crash of 1987. Showing that the market’s growth expectations were very
different just before the crash than they had been a year earlier, he suggests that the growth rate, in
conjunction with consideration of a PE ratio might be a useful indicator of market signal. Francis
[63] argued that the simplified nature of the dividend discount model could lead to conclusions which
are true for the model but not true in general. [See Francis [63] pp. 239-256]. Chen, Roll and Ross
[32] and Keim and Stambaugh [98] utilize equation (3.2) to suggest that the factors contributing to
stock-price variability can be reviewed either as factors that change expected cash flows or as factors
that change discount rates.
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We shall consider the default spread as ex ante yield variables to forecast the
excess stock returns. We use the difference between the yield on a long term below
Baa rated corporate bond portfolio and the yield on a long term Aaa rated bond
portfolio to represent the default spread.
Previous evidence of ex ante variables that predict risk premiums is confined pri¬
marily to specific types of assets and specific time periods. For example, a number
of researchers have found that excess returns on common stocks are negatively corre¬
lated with measures of expected inflation during the post-1953 period, but this result
does not generalize to other types of assets or to other subperiods.2 What we lack is
evidence that one or several variables consistently predict risk premiums over a long
period.
The finance profession appears to believe that expected returns fluctuate through
time as well as across stocks.

These results are interpreted as describing the time

variation in the “risk premium.”
A bit of casual empiricism suggests that fashions and fads in investor attitudes
cause stocks (groups or the entire market) to be at times overpriced, and at other
times underpriced. Moreover, each of these fads eventually comes to an end. Such
behavior would lead us to expect a high return when stock prices are low relative
to dividends (or earnings or some other variable whose importance varies with the
fashion of the day) and expect a low return when stock prices are high relative to
dividends (or earnings).

This type of relationship would imply that the following

naive investment strategy should pay off: buy when price is low relative to dividends
or earnings and sell when it is high.
2See, for example, Jafle and Mandelker [88] and Fama and Schwert [58]. The negative correlation
is particularly strong when the measure of expected inflation is simply the Treasury bill yield, but
the phenomenon is evidently confined to the post-1953 period. Indeed, Fama [52] argues that the
observed correlation is spurious.

28

That stock returns exhibit a peculiar seasonal pattern is now well known.3 Those
who have studied the issue generally have found that, on average, January returns are
significantly higher than the returns for other months. Several studies have examined
seasonality in risk premiums.4 Tinic and West [150] examined the risk premiums of
the two-parameter CAPM. They observed the previously reported seasonality and
high January premium.

They also found that January is the only month having

a consistently positive, statistically significant relationship between expected return
and risk. Recently, using the two-stage procedure with the maximum-likelihood factor
analysis, Gultekin and Gultekin [81] show that the risk premia of the APT tend to
be significant only in January.
In view of the above studies, we shall check for any seasonal patterns in excess
returns of aggregate market. These considerations suggest the discount rate (k) model
shown at equation (3.5).

k = f[DS, EI(orU7), D/P{orE/P), JS]

(3.5)

where;
DS: the default spread
El (or UI): the expected inflation rate (or the unexpected inflation rate)
D/P (or E/P): the dividend-price ratio (or the earnings-price ratio)
JS: the seasonality dummy
3Branch [16], Reinganum [130], DeBondt and Thaler [39] and Gultekin and Gultekin [81]. Fol¬
lowing Branch [16], many authors have suggested tax-loss selling as an explanation of the January
seasonal.
4RozefF and Kinney [137] found that seasonality appeared in the risk premiums obtained from a *
two-parameter CAPM and that January displayed a relatively large risk premium compared with
the other months. Keim [97] also found seasonality in the risk premiums.
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Default Spread
We plan to use the default spread as ex ante yield variables to forecast the ex¬
cess stock returns. The difference between the yields on long-term below Baa rated
corporate bonds and the yield on the highest grade (Aaa) bond portfolio is used to
reflect the market implied default spread.
The default spread represents a direct measure of the degree of risk aversion im¬
plicit in pricing. "We hope that default spread would reflect much of the unanticipated
movement in the degree of risk aversion and in the level of risk implicit in the market’s
pricing of stocks.

This ex ante yield variable, which reflects the level of low-grade

bond prices (relative to promised payments), shares its motivation with another bond
market variable proposed by Chen, Roll and Ross [32' and Keim and Stambaugh [98 .
Chen, Roll and Ross [32 examined the correlation between stock returns and the
contemporaneous (ex post) difference between returns on low-grade bonds and U.S.
Government bonds.

They argued that changes in the relative prices of low-grade

bonds proxy for changes in expected risk premiums. They found that stock returns
are positively correlated with the contemporaneous bond return spread. This result
is consistent with an increase in expected risk premiums (low bond return spread)
accompanying a decrease in the stock price (low stock return). Sharing the motivation
with Chen, Roll and Ross ;32], Keim and Stambaugh [98] used the difference between
yields on long-term below BAA rated (low-grade) corporate bonds and short-term
(approximately one-month) U.S. Treasury bills as an ex ante yield variable to forecast
stock returns.
Most recently, Fama and French [55] show that predictable variations in bond and
stock returns is, in addition to the dividend yields, tracked by measures of default
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and term premia in expected returns.5 Their results show that the default spread is
clear a business-cycle variables.6
The low-grade bond return series is for nonconvertible corporate bonds, and it
is obtained from Ibbotson Associates [87] for the period prior to 1986. A detailed
description of the sample is contained in Ibbotson Associates [87].

The low-grade

series is extended through 1987 by choosing 10 bonds whose ratings were below Baa.

Inflation Rate
According to most financial theories, expected inflation should be the basic un¬
derlying influence in asset pricing. It tends to affect both the expected cash flows and
the discount rate.
Expected cash flows change because of both real and nominal forces.

Changes

in the expected rate of inflation would influence nominal expected cash flows as well
as the nominal rate of interest. To the extent that assets are priced in real terms,
unanticipated price-level changes will have a systematic effect on both pricing and
expected returns. Moreover, to the extent that relative prices change along with

5The default-premium variable (called the default spread) is the difference between the yield on
a proxy for the market portfolio of corporate bonds and the yield on the highest grade (Aaa) bond
portfolio. At the end of September 1987, the default spread (measured as the spread of Baa yields
over Aaa yields) was .27 % (27 basis points), about half its mean value (.55 %) for the 1957-86
period. The default spread rose sharply around October 19th, and at the end of 1987, the spread,
at .50 %, was still below but close to its 1957-86 mean [See Fama [53]].
6As such those variables are high when business is poor and low when the economy is strong.
They interpret these results as follows: business conditions are poor, wealth is low and expected
returns on stocks must be high to induce substitution from consumption to investment. Conversely,
when times are good and wealth is high, the market clears at lower levels of equilibrium expected
returns. Variation in expected returns over the business cycle may also be due to variation in the
risk of stocks. The fact that the default spread signals variations in expected stock returns suggests
that the spread is better interpreted as a general proxy for business conditions rather than as a
simple measure of default risk.
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general inflation, asset valuation changes are associated with changes in the average
inflation rate.
Early empirical work indicates a significant negative relation between inflation
and stock prices7 Fama and Schwert [58] used expected and unanticipated inflation
as well as changes in expectations as explanatory variables. They found a consistent
negative relation between stock returns and each of these three variables. Fama [52]
claimed that the negative stock-inflation relations are induced by negative relations
between inflation and real activity which in turn are explained by a combination
of money demand and the quantity theory of money.8

Similarly Geske and Roll

[69] have developed and tested a model that explains the negative relation between
stock returns and inflation as due to rational investors realizing the adverse impact
of inflation on future economic policy.
Unanticipated inflation is defined as

UIt = It- EIt,

(3.6)

where I(t) is the realized monthly first difference in the logarithm of the Consumer
Price Index for period t. The series of expected inflation, EIt is obtained from Fama
and Gibbons’ interest rate model [66].
If ERt-i denotes an expected real return for month and EIt-1 denotes an expected
inflation rate, then Fisher’s equation asserts that

TBt-i = ERt-i + EIt-1.

(3.7)

Hence, TBt~\ — It measures the ex post real return on Treasury bills in the period.
From a time-series analysis of this variable, Fama and Gibbons [66] constructed a
7Lintner [108], Jaffe and Mandelker [88] and Fama and Schwert [58] found a negative relation
between stock returns and both expected and unanticipated inflation.
8Both Fama’s theoretical model and empirical tests seem to support his contention that the
observed simple stock market/inflation results from the proxy effects of an underspecified model.
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time series for EIt-Our expected inflation variable is defined by subtracting their
time series for the expected real rate from the TBt-1 series.9

Dividend-Price Ratio
Most previous studies of the dividend-price ratio have been concerned with the
cross-sectional relationship between dividend-price ratios and average returns. The
ability of the dividend-price ratio to predict returns has, however, been noted by
several authors.10
From equation (3.2), the dividend yield is the interest rate less the dividend growth
rate in dividends,
Dt
- = k-g.

(3.8)

“t-1

In the certainty model, the interest rate k is the discount rate for dividends and
the period-by-period return for the stock.* 11 The direct relation between the dividend
yield and the interest rate in the certainty model (3.8) suffices, however, to illustrate
that yields are likely to capture variation in expected returns. The intuition of the
hypothesis that dividend yields forecast returns is as follows:

stock prices are low

relative to dividends when discount rates and expected returns are high, and vice
versa. Thus yields capture variation in expected returns. A similar intuition applies
for the earnings-price ratio (E/P).
9If positive (negative) stock returns are associated with negative (positive) changes in the real
interest rate, stock returns may be negatively correlated with changes in the Treasury bill rate,
the proxy for expected inflation, even when stock returns and inflation are not directly related.
A change in the real rate of interest should be a true cause of ex post stock returns, because an
increase (decrease) in the real interest rate induces a reduction (increase) in all asset values. Thus,
the beginning-of-period T-bill rate’s real interest component and the subsequent expected stock
returns may be positively related.
10Shiller [146] and Flood, Hodrick, and Kaplan [61]
11 The transition from certainty to a model that (a) accommodates uncertain future dividends
and discount rates and (b) shows that the correspondence between discount rates and time-varying
expected returns is difficult [See Campbell and Shiller [26] and Poterba and Summers [127]].
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The efficient market hypothesis has been traditionally associated with the asser¬
tion that future price changes are unpredictable. Many early observers of financial
markets, however, believed that security prices could diverge from their fundamen¬
tal values.12

More recently, the idea that fashions and fads in investor attitudes

(or other types of systematic “irrationality”) may affect stock prices has gained new
respectability.13
However, so long as prices have any tendency to gravitate back to fundamen¬
tals, they will be mean-reverting over long horizons.

That is, they are somewhat

predictable and not a random walk. In particular, if one takes a long-term perspec¬
tive, then stock returns display significant negative serial correlation. In other words,
prices are mean reverting.14 The proposition that prices are mean reverting implies
that prices are predictable.
Rozeff [136] showed that the equity risk premium can be proxied by the prospec¬
tive dividend yield based on the Golden Rule of Accumulation in the context of the
Gordon growth Model.15 He defines the equity risk premium as the required return
on equity minus the riskless rate of interest. He then converts real growth and the
real riskless interest rate into nominal values by adding the expected inflation rate to
12 For example Keynes [99]
13See Chapter Two, Shiller [146], De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann [41], and Shefrin
and Statman [142] investigated economies with both rational “information” traders and irrational
“noise” traders. In a world populated by noise traders, rational traders do not necessarily dominate
the market nor do noise traders become extinct, even in the long run. Also, prices do not necessarily
equal intrinsic value.
140ne type of mean reversion in cross-sectional stock prices has been discussed in the literature
at least since the time of Graham [72].

Modern empirical work suggests that simple contrarian

strategies do yield excess returns [Basu [7]]. Substantial evidence in the psychology literature imply
that individuals tend to overweight recent data in making forecasts and judgements [Kahneman
and Tversky [95]].

Shiller [146] argues that mass psychology may well be the dominant cause of

movements in the price of the aggregate stock market.

If this behavior is manifest in financial

markets, then we should observe mean-reverting returns to stocks that have experienced extremely
good or poor returns over the past few years.
15If the economy maximizes consumption per capita, then the rate of growth of output equals the
physical marginal productivity of capital, which in turn equals the rate of interest.
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each. Essentially a Fisher effect adjustment is applied to both variables. When he
subtracts the riskless rate from both sides of the Gordon growth model, he derives
his equation.16

risk premium =

A(l+g)
P

+ (G + I) — (R + I)

(3.10)

where D is the current dividend level, I is the expected rate of inflation, g is the
nominal rate of growth in dividends, G is the real rate of growth in dividends, P is
the price of the stock, R is the real riskless rate of interest.
Invoking the Golden Rule of Accumulation17, the above expression can be simpli¬
fied to his equation (3.11 ):18 E
D( 1 + r)
risk premium = -

,
(3.11)

where r(the nominal riskless rate) has replaced g in the dividend yield formulation,
due to their assumed equality. Since (D x r) tends to be small compared to D, the
equity risk premium approximately equals the current dividend yield on stocks.
Using annual data, he shows that the stock return earned in the following years
rises as the dividend yield in the prior year increases. His results imply that high

16The expected rate of return on the stock market is equal to the dividend yield variable on the
market plus the anticipated growth rate of dividend, (D-r

risk premium

=

+,-(* + !) =
P

g), therefore,

SiL±A
+ (g+/)-(«+/)
P

(3.9)

17the growth rate of physical output equals the real rate of interest in an equilibrium in which
consumption per capita is maximized
18Johnson [93] showed that Rozeff’s results holds only for (1) long time periods, as opposed to
individual years, (2) the aggregate stock market, as opposed to an individual firm’s equity.
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returns tend to occur when the environment is perceived to be so risky that investors
demand a high premium for holding stocks and low returns tend to occur when the
environment is perceived to hold such modest risk that investors demand a low risk
premium for holding stocks.19
Most recently, Fama and French [54,56] use regressions of returns on dividend
yields to track expected returns. As in earlier works, these regressions explain small
fractions of monthly and quarterly return variances. But excess of 30% of variances
are commonly explained for return horizons (holding periods) beyond a year.20
Campbell and Shiller [27] use the dividend-price ratio model to compute the impli¬
cations of this predictability for the behavior of the dividend-price ratio. They utilize
the vector autoregressive methods(VAR) finding that the lagged log dividend-price
ratio has a positive relation to stock returns. Thus the dividend-price ratio appears to
be an appropriate candidate for explaining the risk environment of the stock market
over time. We plan to use yields based on annual dividends to avoid seasonals in
dividends.

Earnings-Price Ratio
Earnings data are appropriate candidate variables for forecasting stock returns. A
similar intuition can be applied for the earnings-price ratio as for the dividend-price
19At the end of September 1987, the dividend/price ratio for the S&P 500 was 2.78 %, compared to
its average value for the 1957-86 period of about 3.8 %. At the end of December, the dividend/price
ratio for the S&P 500 was 3.71 %, still below but not far from its mean, 3.8 %, for the last 30 years
[See Fama [53]].
20Suppose shocks to expected returns and shocks to rational forecasts of dividends are independent.
Then the cumulative effect of a shock on expected returns must be exactly offset by an opposite
adjustment in the current price. It follows that mean-reverting equilibrium expected returns can give
rise to mean-reverting (temporary) components of stock prices [See Poterbaand Summers [127]]. On
the other hand, temporary components of prices and the forecast power of yields are also consistent
with common models of an inefficient market, in which stock prices take long temporary swings
away from fundamental values [cited in chapter Two]. In this view, high dividend-price ratios signal
that future returns will be high because stock prices are temporarily irrationally low. Conversely,
low dividend-ratios signal irrationally high prices and low future returns.
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ratio. The notion underlying such propositions is that if stocks are underpriced
relative to fundamental value (high E/P), subsequent returns tend to be high; the
converse holds if stocks are overpriced.
The ratio of earnings to market price reflects the investment community’s degree
of optimism or pessimism regarding the outlook for future earnings. The earningsprice ratio theoretically expresses a market discount rate that serves as a positive and
straight-forward contribution to the stock return. Many empirical studies support the
hypothesis that ex post stock returns correlate positively with ex ante earnings-price
ratios.21
Recently, Campbell and Shiller [27] show that the earnings-price ratio is a powerful
predictor of the returns and excess returns on stocks, particularly when the return is
measured over several years. Sorensen and Arnott [147] show that the equity market
risk premium based on earnings yield has a 26% correlation with the one-month equity
market excess return.
The economic cycle may impair the effectiveness of the simple earnings- price ratio
based model. Specifically, reported earnings may be overstated during an economic
boom and understated during recession, leading to an overestimation of the stock
market’s attractiveness during a boom and an understated appeal during a recession.

21 Most studies conclude that stocks with high earnings-price ratios tend to have superior returns;
see Basu [7], Cook and Rozeff [36]. Whether stocks with a high earnings-price ratio will have a
relatively high return has been the subject of much discussion in the literature. Simple correlation
across firms has been found between such ratios and returns. Basu [7] concluded that risk-adjusted
returns are positively correlated with the earnings-price ratio even after controlling for firm size. As
Basu notes, however, his tests depend on the risk measurement assumed. Elgers, Callahan and Strock
[48] claimed that Basu’s findings were due to (1) a classification bias inherent in the market index
earnings expectation model used, and (2) failure of the returns conditioning model to incorporate
a share price effect on security returns. They showed empirically that when a suitable model for
expected earnings is used and the influence of share price upon security returns is controlled for,
earnings yields are unrelated to the unexpected earnings-security association.
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By using a long-term average of earnings, we smooth out the impact of valuation
errors that occur because of peak earnings or depressed earnings. Accordingly, a 3yeai double exponential moving average of earnings is used to give the greatest weight
to the more recent observation.22
Thus we believe that the earnings-price ratios is a possible candidate for explaining
the risk environment of the stock market over time.

Excess Return Seasonality
Many researchers document stock market anomalies that challenge the efficient
markets hypothesis. While the existence of seasonal patterns is difficult to contest,
the cause of such patterns is much in dispute.
One explanation offered by Branch [16] and Dvl [45] for the January seasonal
suggests that tax-loss selling pressures in December temporarily drive security prices
below their equilibrium levels and cause abnormal gains in January when incentives to
sell for tax purposes are gone.23. A second explanation for the January seasonal is that
macroeconomic forces that help determine security returns follow a seasonal pattern
themselves. This argument is implicit in Chan, Chen, and Hsieh’s [30] attempt to
eliminate the January stock seasonal by examining return residuals from a multifactor
model in which each factor was a macroeconomic variable.

22The use of an average of earnings in computing the earnings-price ratio has a long history.
Graham and Dodd [73' recommended an approach that “shifts the original point of departure,
or basis of computation, from the current earnings to the average earnings, which should cover a
period of not less than five years, and preferably seven to ten years.” Exponential moving average
of earnings will slowly forget the relevance of past data.
23Branch [16], Dyl [45], Reinganum [130]
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To date. no angle explanation accounts totally for the observed stock market
seasonal*

Nor do we attempt to provide such an explanation here. We plan to check

for any seasonal patterns in excess returns of the aggregate stock market.

3.2.2

Determinants of the Appropriate Growth Rate

The expected mean growth rate of earnings, g, is a function of both short and
long-term factors.

We assume that over the long-run profits represent a relatively

constant percentage of GXP. Thus the economy's long-term growth rate in output
should approximate the long-term growth rate in corporate earnings.

And thus,

with an approximately constant payout rate, also be equivalent to the long-term
growth rate for dividends. Such forces as the rates of technological change, capital
accumulation and population growth largely determine the long-term trend in the
economy. Such factors should be sufficiently stable to produce a relatively constant
long term trend. Most fluctuations in stock prices are, however, a reaction to shorter
term changes.

The actual growth rate, g. will vary from its long term trend as a

result of two basic factors: (1) where the economy is relative to its trend line value
and (2) how stimulative or restrictive an economic policy is pursued.
An economy that is producing goods and services at well below its potential
rate can. in the short run. expand much more rapidly than can an economy that is
operating close to capacity. A rapidly expanding economy will tend to produce even
more rapidly growing earnings because initially at least, revenues tend to increase
much faster than capacity.

Thus so called “fixed costs’

are spread over an ever

larger revenue base thereby allowing price-cost margins to expand. The process works
in reverse for a contracting economy: profits fall proportionately more than sales.
Realizing these relationships, the market expects the economy to generate rapidly
growing (declining) profits once it begins to emerge from (go into) a recession. The
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position of the economy relative to the long term trend in capacity can be measured
by the level of industrial production activity.
Some evidence suggests that an ability to foresee business cycle turning points
for several months ahead improves the ability to foresee major turning points in the
general level of stock prices.24 The evidence does not imply that every bear market
must be accompanied by an economic recession or vice versa. However, stock prices
have evidenced a pronounced tendency to decline prior to an economic downturn.
Accordingly, if a recession or a slowdown of economic growth appears to lie ahead,
the odds are high that it will be preceded by a significant stock market downturn
some months in advance.25
If we can forecast business cycles earlier and/or more accurately than the market
and allocate funds accordingly, we can avoid the recession induced drop in the market
portfolio and outperform the market during a recession.
We quantify the degree to which investors are out of step using the implied market
growth rate from equation (3.2). Such a mispricing creates attractive relative valua¬
tion opportunities involving stocks and cash. We also plan to use a direct measure of
actual growth in earnings per share during alternative past periods.
Putting the above factors together we have;
g = f[G,AIP,CI,UI(arEI)]

(3.12)

where;
G: the implied market growth rate
s

A IP: the changes in the industrial production,
Cl: the cycle indicator,
UI (or El): the unexpected inflation rate (or the expected inflation rate), and
24Umstead [157]
25For example, Piccini [125] concluded that the best time to sell stocks is probably one to three
months before a recession begins.
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Industrial Production
Changes in the expected level of real production would affect the current real
value of cash flows. Insofar as the risk-premium measure does not capture industrial
production uncertainty, the changes in the rate of productive activity should have an
influence on stock returns through their impact on cash flows.
The basic series is the growth rate in U.S. industrial production which was ob¬
tained from the Survey of Current Business.

If IPt denotes the rate of industrial

production in month t, then the monthly growth rate is

AIPt = log IPt - log I(3.13)

Implied Growth Rate
Equation (3.2) provides a means for developing explicit return estimates for both
individual stocks as well as the aggregate market.

Transforming equation (3.2) to

solve for the implied growth rate, g yields the following:
(3.14)

We can convert equation (3.14) into a real implied growth rate, g\ by subtracting an
inflation rate, I, from the nominal implied growth rate, g:

g' = k-j-I

(3.15)

Note that the real implied growth rate (g') is equal to the appropriate required rate of
return (k) minus the dividend-price ratio and the inflation rate. Thus with estimates
for k, D/P and I (appropriate required rate of return, dividend yield, the expected
inflation rate) we can solve for the implied market expected real growth rate in div¬
idends, g\ and the degree to which the implied market expected real growth rate in
dividends are out of step from the average market growth rate in the past, g — g .
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"While these proxies are imperfect, they are probably reasonably close to the market’s
acttial expectations. Hopefully imperfections in the proxies do not lead to system¬
atic errors over the time of this analysis. Since the expected growth of the economy
has ramifications for stock investing, a reliable model of the expected growth might
provide a useful benchmark that could help one forecast the market risk environment.
Rather than examining indirect measures of growth rates in earnings, we also use
a direct measure of actual growth rate in earnings per share during alternative past
periods. These growth rates are similar to the variables used in past studies.26 For
each month, a yearly average of the prior twelve months is derived and then computed
the percentage change during the last year. Average growth rates are derived for oneand three-year periods by computing the average percent change for each interval on
a moving basis.

Cycle Indicators
Picdni 125 explores the relationship between stock market movements and busi¬
ness cycles. He shows that the investor should sell stocks one to three months before
a recession begins rather than wait until a clear indication of a recession is present.27
Previous studies have found that composite indicators are able to predict (with errors)
business cycles.28

26Malkiel and Cragg [117]
2’Because the averages have moved over a fairly narrow range prior to cyclical peaks, investors
would probably do nearly as well by selling eight months before the peak in economic activity. Cau¬
tious investors should probably wait at least six months into a recession before the} start reacquiring
stocks.
28Umstead 157]
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The search for leading, coincident and lagging indicators of general economic ac¬
tivity has been one of the major continuing projects of the National Bureau of Eco¬
nomic Research (NBER). Business Conditions Digest classifies indicators by their
participation in the stage of economic process and their relationship to business cycle
movements.
Moore and Zarnowitz [159] show that early and confirming signals of business
cycle peaks and troughs are produced sequentially on a current basis by a system
of monitoring smoothed rates of change in the composite indexes of leading and
coincident indicators.29
We believe that a ratio of coincident to lagging indicators may offer better timing
signals, at least for those cycles in which stocks led the way and business followed
and the lagging indicators contain series such as interest rates, unit costs of output,
etc., and a rise in these factors operates to brake a rise in business and profits alike.30

29The expected sequence of signals at business cycle peaks, then, is when each of the following
conditions is first observed: First signal (PI): The leading index falls below 3.3%, while the coinci¬
dent index rate is positive

(L

< 3.3;

C

> 0 ). Second signal (P2): The leading index rate becomes

negative, and the coincident index rate falls below 3.3%

(L <

0;

the leading index rate and the coincident rate become negative

C < 3.3 ). Third
( L < 0; C < 0).

signal (P3): Both
At business cycle

troughs, the signals they have selected are slightly different, occurring when each of the following
conditions is first observed:

First signal (Tl): the leading index rate rises above zero, while the

coincident index rate is negative

(L

> 0;

C

< 0). Second signal (T2): The leading index rate rises

above 3.3%, and the coincident index rate rises above zero (

L

> 3.3;

Both the leading index rate and the coincident index rate exceed 3.3%
30

Wall Street Journal

C >
(L >

0). Third signal (T3):
3.3;

C

> 3.3).

editor Malabre also seem convinced that this ratio gives earlier warning of

turns in business than do the leading indicators.[WSJ, Feb. 14, 1978] The ratio of the coincident
index to the lagging index contains information that is related to stock market activity. Coincident
indicators historically reach their turning points at about the same time as the general economy.
Lagging indicators reach their peaks and troughs at a time later than the corresponding business
cycle turns. The index of four roughly coincident indicators is composed of (1) number of employees
on non-agricultural payrolls, (2) index of industrial production, (3) personal income, less transfer
payments, (4) manufacturing and trade sales. The index of 6 roughly lagging indicators is composed
of (1) index of labor costs, (2) manufacturing and trade inventories, (3) commercial and industrial
loans outstanding, (4) average duration of unemployment in weeks, (5) ratio, consumer installment
credit to personal income, (6) average prime rate charged by banks. A composite of the coincident
and lagging indicators may provide information that is useful in predicting stock market condition.

43

In contrast to using some business cycle indicators, we shall also consider some
direct measure of the stock market cycle.

Technical analysts frequently follow the

trends of moving averages, comparing them to the trend of the current data. This
approach provides them with a trading signal.

When current prices are rising and

the current price rises above the moving average, technical analysts see a buy signal;
when current prices are falling and the current price falls below the moving average, it
is a sell signal. For example, at market tops, when prices have been rising, the current
price will be above the moving average since the moving average is being pulled along
behind. When a downtrend in prices begins, current prices will fall more rapidly than
the moving average, and eventually they will cut through the trailing moving average.
This is a signal that the market has started to turn down. Technical analysts view
this as the time to sell. The opposite scenario occurs at market bottoms.
Moving average trading systems are trend-following systems. That is, they signal a
move in the market after the trend has changed. Thus, such systems are not expected
to get an investor into the market at the exact bottom or out at the exact top. Rather,
the systems are designed to keep an investor on the right side of the market for the
longer trends. The longer the moving average, the slower the indicator is to signal a
change in trend. But a longer moving average also provides fewer false signals. We
plan to include 7-month S&P 500 moving average, (or exponential moving average)31
The following variables are initial candidates to predict business cycles.

1. Ratio, Coincident Composite Index to Lagging Composite Index

2. 7-month S&P 500 moving average

3. Criteria from Moore and Zarnowitz

31 “200-day moving average” has been recommended by many authors.
WSJ [May 12, 1989]
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See Remaley [129], and

3.2.3

Determinants of the Dividends

Earnings represent a useful summary of the available information about the future
cash flows from an equity investment.

Stock valuation models commonly employ

some measure of earnings as their major parameter.

Earnings per share emerge

from various studies as the single most important accounting variable in the eye of
investors. A substantial body of research has dealt with the information content of
earnings numbers. The main findings is that earnings are correlated with factors that
determine prices.32
Virtually everyone agrees that the prices of investments are largely determined by
their expected cash flows. Thus knowledge of the average value of these expectations
should already be incorporated in the price, and buying on the basis of average
expectations should not lead to excess returns. Few people need to be convinced that
expectations play an important role in determining prices. Accordingly, one should
be able to earn larger excess returns by knowing (at least directional) the error in
the earnings forecasts. Investment in a period with high actual earnings should not
necessarily lead to excess returns unless the market was forecasting low earnings.
Therefore, knowledge concerning differences between actual earnings and forecasted
earnings (unexpected earnings) should lead to higher excess returns than knowledge
concerning actual earnings itself. Thus, an unanticipated change in earnings causes
a predictable change in the next period’s dividends.
We have;
D = f[EF(orU E)\

32Ball and Brown [5] and Beaver, Lambert, and Morse [8]

45

(3.16)

where;
EF (or UE): the earnings forecasts (or the unexpected earnings)
Recently, earnings expectational data have become more available. Accordingly,
more attention has been directed toward the examination of the properties of ana¬
lysts forecasts of earnings, the information content of these forecasts, and the manner
by which earnings forecast revisions impact security prices. These studies find that
revisions in analysts’ forecasts of earnings stir market reaction. Furthermore, infor¬
mation on these revisions may be used to construct profitable investment strategies.33
That is, financial analysts’ forecasts are, to a degree, a leading indicator of individual
securities’ price change.

Numerous studies, starting with Ball and Brown [5], also

documented a relation between ex post unexpected earnings and ex post unexpected
stock returns.34
Examination of the association between unexpected earnings and security returns
requires a suitable measure of the market’s expectation of earnings.

Prior studies

have relied upon either time-series models35 or upon published financial analysts’
forecasts.36

Several studies demonstrate that analysts’ forecasts are more accurate

than those from univariate models, presumably because of the broader information
set they can incorporate.37

But only scant evidence bears on the extent to which

aggregate measures of analysts’ forecasts of earnings can be used as an appropriate
proxy of the stock market as a whole.

Data gathering difficulties are probably the

33Givoly and Lakonishok [71], Elton, Gruber, and Gultekin [49], and Brown, Griffin, Hagerman,
and Zmijewski [20]
34Brown, Griffin, Hagerman and Zmijewski [20]
35Foster [62] and Brown and RozefF [22]
36Fried and Givoly [66], Brown, Griffin, Hagerman and Zmijewski [20,21]
37Brown, Griffin, Hagerman and Zmijewski [20,21] conducted a comprehensive comparison of
quarterly unexpected earnings measures based upon analysts’ forecasts and three univariate timeseries models. They report that analysts’ forecasts are a superior single proxy for market earnings
expectations.

They further suggest that researchers use financial analysts’ forecasts rather than

time-series models as a proxy for market earnings expectations.
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most serious obstacle to use financial analysts’ forecasts.38

We use a Box-Jenkins

model to forecast earnings.

3.2.4

Determinants of T-bill Return

Following Fisher [60], the one-month interest rate, TBt-\, observed at the end
of month t-1 can be broken into an expected real return for month t, ERt_u and
expected inflation rate, EIt~1?

TBt-1 = ERt_i 4- EIt~\.

(3-17)

TBt = TBt_i -f AEIt-i.39

(3.19)

From equation (3.18),

These considerations suggests the T-bill rate model (TB) shown at equation (3.21).

TBt = f[TBt-i(orATBt-i), AEl(orUI)]

(3.20)

where:
ATBt-\. the changes in the T-bill rate,
AEI(orUI): the expected inflation (or the unexpected inflation rate).

i%Indeed. several financial services are being engaged in the collection and publication of forecasts
for a multiple of companies. Institutional Brokers Estimates System (IBES), Standard and Poor’s
Earnings Forecaster lists and Icarus Services by Zacks Investment Research, Inc. The IBES data
are available to us only in the years 1976-1987.
3&From equation (3.18),

TBt - TBt~i

=

AERt-i

■+

AEIt-i.

(3.19)

The evidence of Hess and Bicksler [84], Garbade and Wachtel [68] and Fama and Gibbons [66]
suggests a model in which the expected real return is a random walk. I=Af the expected real return
is a random walk, we can use equation (3.20) instead of (3.18)
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CHAPTER 4
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A two step procedure is used to integrate appropriate variables into the asset
allocation process. The first step involves the generation of state probabilities from
a logit analysis of the sample data.1

Each month within the time periods included

in the study is categorized as either a “bullish” market months (total return on
stocks, including dividends, exceeds the return on cash equivalent) or as a “bearish”
market month (the reverse of a “bullish” market).

The goal is to use the data to

provide the investor with an estimate of the probabilities associated with the broad
measure of either a “bullish” or “bearish” market period.

Logit analysis is used to

determine which of the various data significantly affect the probabilities of “bullish”
and “bearish” market months.

Determination of how well the model performs in

predicting “bullish” (“bearish”) market months is based on;
• the sample used to estimate the logit coefficients; and
• extra sample data.
The extra sample data is used in the model verification process.
1 We believe that investment timing depends more on a proper forecast of the direction than of the
magnitude of risk environment. Furthermore, logit analysis is superior in generating probabilities
of risk environment as compared to OLS. Since the forecast of the risk environment of the coming
month is the main emphasis of this study, we compare the model using logit analysis with the model
using OLS in terms of rate of return in Chapter 6.
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The second step of the procedure is to use the estimated probabilities generated
by the logit analysis to suggest the optimal allocation of funds between the risk-free
asset and the market portfolio.

An asset allocation strategy is developed for the

purpose of evaluating the feasibility of the procedure.

4.1

Data

The asset allocation procedure requires a comparison of the relative performance
of the market portfolio and the risk-free asset. The market portfolio is represented
by the total return on the S&P 500 Composite Index.

The S&P 500 is selected

as the market series because “it is readily available, carefully constructed, market
value-weighted benchmark of common stock performance”.2

The risk-free asset is

represented by the total return on 1-month U.S. Treasury bills. We use U.S. Treasury
index which Ibbotson and Sinquerfield [87] has constructed.

They use the data in

the CRSP U.S. Government Bond file through 1976, and The Wall Street Journal
thereafter. They construct each month a one-bill portfolio containing the short-term
bill having not less than one month to maturity. To measure holding period returns
for the one-bill portfolio, they price the bill as of the last trading day of the previous
month-end and as of the last trading day of the current month. The price of the bill
at each time is given as (1 - rt/360), where r is the yield on the bill at that time (the
average of bid and ask quotes in The Wall Street Journal, converted to decimal form)
and t is the number of days to maturity. The month-end price divided by the previous
month-end price, minus one, is the return on the bill over the month in question. A 1month excess return is the difference between the continuously compounded 1-month
2By market value weighted, we mean that the weight of each stock in the index is proportionate
to its price times the number of shares outstanding. [Ibbotson and Sinquerfield [87]]

W*SJ

reports

that The S &P 500’s performance in 1988 differed by as much as half a percentage point, depending
on which of investment firms did the computing.

The tabulation and factors such as when the

dividends are considered to be received may be handled in a variety of legitimate ways.
Jan.26, 1989]
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on stock portfolio and the continuously compounded 1-month Treasury bill return
from Ibbotson associates [87].
Monthly data on all of these variables is gathered for the time period from January
1962 to December 1988. Twenty-seven years is long enough to contain several major
market cycles and therefore sufficiently long to justify the use of asymptotic statistical
theory. Each month, beginning with the first month of 1962 and continuing through
the last month of 1976, is evaluated by comparing the monthly return on the market
portfolio represented by the S&P 500 Index to the monthly return on the risk-free asset
(U.S. Treasury bills) to determine whether the month was a “bullish” or “bearish”
month as previously defined. The classification of the state of each month becomes
the dichotomous dependent variable for the logit model (“bullish” = 1 and “bearish”
= 0). A holdout sample, comprised of all months beginning in 1977 and continuing
through the last month of 1987, is evaluated for the purpose of model verification.
The sources of data include various issues of the Business Conditions Digest,
Survey of Current Business, The Wall Street Journal, The SEC Statistical Bulletin
and Ibbotson and Sinquerfield [87].
To be useful, the data must be available to the investor at the time the asset
allocation decision is made. Therefore, the publication lags of all variables used in
this study are taken into consideration.3
Table 4.1 reports the variables, definitions and data sources.
3Figure 4.1 illustrates the typical sequence of events which result in the publication of the CPI.
First, the price data are sampled in the middle of the month, so that the January inflation rate
measures price changes which occur between December 15 and January 15. This is referred to as
the measurement month.

Second, previous researchers have used stock returns from the end of

one month to the end of the next month, thus measuring the stock market reaction to January s
inflation over the calendar month from January 1 to January 31.

Third, the Bureau of Labor

Statistics doesn’t announce the CPI until approximately three weeks after the end of the calendar
month. Thus, the January inflation rate is announced on about February 21 [See Schwert [138]].
Umstead [157] suggests a one-month publication lag for the leading composite index published by
the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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Table 4.1

Variables, Definitions and Data sources

Variable

Definition or Source

Stock return

Return on S&P 500
from Ibbotson and Sinquerfield [87],
updated for 1987-1988 (CRSP)

Treasury bill return

Return on 1-month T-bill
from Ibbotson and Sinquerfield [87],
updated for 1987-1988 (CRSP)

Yield on below

Yields from Business Statistics

Baa-rated long-term bonds

and Survey of Current Business

Yield on Aaa-rated bonds

Yields from Business Statistics
and Survey of Current business

Monthly growth,

log IPt - log IPt-1

industrial production

from Business Statistics
and Survey of Current Business

The dividend-price ratio

Yields based on annual dividends
from Business Statistics
and Survey of Current Business

The Composite Index

published by the U.S. Department of Commerce
in the Business Conditions Digest
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4.2

Logit Analysis

The problem to be addressed herein is the prediction of “bullish” and “bearish”
market months from appropriate data. The questions to be answered are

• W hat are the appropriate variables that significantly affect the probability of
the market’s excess return; and

• How accurately does the model predict a given state of the market0

Superficially, the problem appears appropriate for the use of ordinary least squares
regression analysis (OLS). However, several problems are encountered with that tech
nique due to the categorical nature of the dependent variable.

Regression analysis

assumes that the data satisfies the following assumptions:

Y = Bo

BiXn -f ... -f Bp-i AliP_i + ei

(4.1)

where
Bq, Bi,..., Bp-i are unknown parameters
A^i,..., Arl(P_i are known, non-stochastic variables
e{ are error terms that are independent, and N(0,<r2)
i = 1,..., n
The purpose of the regression model is to specify the relationship between X and
Y by estimating the actual parameters, J9p_i, which generated by sample data. OLS
passes a line through the data which minimizes the sum of the squared deviations
of the observed points from corresponding points on the fitted line with the same X
coordinates. Under classical regression assumptions, the estimates generated by the
OLS procedure are the Best Linear Unbiased Estimates (BLUE) of the popuiatioi
parameters.

If the error term “e” is normally distributed, then the least squares

estimates are identical with the maximum likelihood estimates.
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However, due to the categorical nature of the dependent variable used in this
study, the assumptions of the regression model are not met.

The difficulties of the

standard regression model when the dependent variable is dichotomous are adequately
explained by Judge, Griffiths, Hill, and Lee [94].

The regression model implicitly

assumes a cardinal dependent variable. Therefore, regression is an inappropriate tool
for the analysis of “bullish” and “bearish” stock market periods as defined in this
study. The logit model is developed specifically to overcome the problems encountered
with OLS when the dependent variable is categorical.4

Multicollinearity can affect

the signs of logit coefficients; however, unlike regression analysis, multicollinearity
is expected to have no effect on testing the significance of individual variables in
a logit equation. In regression analysis, multicollinearity biases the standard errors
of the regression coefficients which in turn are used in individual t tests. Since such
standard errors are not considered in maximum likelihood ratio tests, multicollinearity
is expected to have no effect on these tests. The computation cost of logit analysis
is likely to be greater than that of discriminant analysis.

Discriminant analysis,

however, requires very restrictive assumptions, including multivariate normality of the
independent variables and equal covariances across all groups. Further, discriminant
analysis does not generate accurate probabilities and unique discriminant coefficients.
In view of these problems and limitations, discriminant analysis is not an appropriate
statistical technique for constructing market timing models.
4Probit and logit deal with the identical problem of predicting the level of a dependent variable
that is measured on a nominal or ordinal scale. The difference lies solely in the assumption made
about the frequency distribution of this response. In probit it is taken to be normally distributed; in
logit, a logistic distribution is assumed. The choice of model is largely a matter of personal preference
rather than practical significanc.e. Empirically it makes little difference, first because all the formulas
and results central to probit can be simply rewritten in terms of the logistic transformation. Second,
the results of both transformations are very similar. Very large data sets would be needed to show
that one gives a better fit than the other for any particular study. Most economists have favored
logit because of the direct interpretability of the logistic function.
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Logit analysis will generate the Y(A";) from the linear combination of the explana¬
tory variables as shown by the equation:

Y = X£ + e

(4.2)

where; Y is (Nxl) vector of response variable, X is an (NxP) matrix of n observations
of k explanatory variables,

is a (Pxl) vector of unknown coefficients and e is an

(Nxl) vector of error terms.
For the

ith

observation, the first category (Rx) will be observed if:

the second category

(R2)

will be observed if

P(Rj) = P{Uj

-1

=

F(Y(Xt)

<

F(.)

the mean of

Rj

is:

Y(Xi))

- —i—•) -

(4.3)

F(Y(Xi) -&)

<J

where:

(4.4)

<J

is the cumulative logistic probability distribution function and

Y(X{)

for the

ith

observation

< Uu

U\ < Y(X.) < U2.

Thus the probability of observing a particular response

P(Rj)

Y[X{)

(E(Yi) =

£m=i

Y(X{)

is

BmX.m^).

As can be observed from equation (4.3) and (4.4), the problem of estimating the

P(Rj)

is the same as estimating the

Y

and the

Uj

s. The estimation of

Y

only requires

the joint estimation of B and U in order to determine the probability of observing
particular responses for the dependent variable given the values of the independent
variable.
Maximum likelihood estimation is an appropriate procedure for the joint esti¬
mation of B and U. One of the principal advantages of using maximum likelihood
estimation rather than discriminant analysis is that the statistical properties of the
maximum likelihood estimators are both known and desirable. The general expression
for the jth response for the ith observation is determined following:

P(Rj,i)

=

F(E BmXm.i - Uj.0
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-

F(£

1 -

Uj)

(4.5)

The corresponding log likelihood function is

L-(B, U) =

£ £)

l„[F( £

- rr,_x) - B( £

t=l j=l

m=l

m=l

- IT,)]

(4.6)

The first order condition for maximum likelihood estimates is given by partially dif¬
ferentiating (4.6) with respect to i?m and Uj and setting each partial derivative to

dLm(B,U)
dBm

dL~(B,U)

dUj

= 0, m = 1,... ,p

(4.7)

II
o
Wo.
II
to

zero as follows:

(4.8)

Simultaneously solving the resulting system of P+N-2 non-linear (in the B’s and
U’s) equations can be accomplished through the use of gradient methods, e.g. the
Gauss-Newton optimization technique. The estimates of B and U are then used to
find the probability of a particular response (j) for a given observation (i) P{Rj,i) by
substituting the estimated values into (4.4).

56

CHAPTER 5
CONSTRUCTION AND
VALIDATION OF THE MODEL
5.1

Explanatory Variable Structure

This section describes the basic characteristics for all the sample months, bullish
market months only, and bearish market months.1
Table 5.1 reviews the explanatory variables used in the analysis and represents the
abbreviations used in subsequent statistical tables. Table 5.2 presents the descriptive
statistics of explanatory variables and reveals some interesting characteristics about
the sample data.
The eight proxies selected as independent variables are not normally distributed.
In particular, since normal distributions are symmetrical and unimodal, they have
skewness indices of zero and kurtosis indices of three. As can be seen from Table 5.2,
however, the descriptive statistics associated with the eight independent variables
selected show that these variables have non-zero skewness indices.

Therefore, the

selected variables are not univariate normal and hence, not multivariate normal.2
1 While we consider all the variables we have discussed in Chapter 3, we have listed only the
variables with a significant relation to the dependent variable.
2Univariate normality is a necessary but not sufficient condition of multivariate normality. Thus,
these variables that are not univariate normal cannot be multivariate normal.
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Table 5.1

Explanatory Abbreviations

Variable Abbreviation

Variable Definition

DS

Default Spread

DP

Dividend-Price Ratio

EP

Earnings-Price Ratio

G

Growth Rate from DDM

ERNG

Average Earinings Growth Rate
for one-year on a Moving Basis

Cl

Cycle Indicators

DTB

The Change in 1-month T-bill Rate

PTB

T-bill Rate in Previous Month
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Table 5.2

Descriptive Sample Statistics

Explanatory

Descriptive

Variables

Statistics

DS

DP

EP

G

ERNG

Cl

DTB

PTB

All

Bullish

Bearish

Mean

0.008573

0.008691

0.008485

Standard Deviation

0.003867

0.004160

0.003523

Skewness

1.111

1.048

1.188

Kurtosis

0.789

0.454

1.319

Mean

3.3897

3.4065

3.3698

Standard Deviation

0.5363

0.554

0.518

Skewness

1.659

1.678

1.648

Kurtosis

3.091

2.972

3.469

Mean

0.0597

0.05955

0.06024

Standard Deviation

0.0145

0.015

0.014

Skewness

1.357

1.463

1.219

Kurtosis

1.109

1.425

1.109

Mean

0.00018

-0.00103

0.00161

Standard Deviation

0.00783

0.00790

0.00755

Skewness

-0.270

-0.206

-0.335

Kurtosis

-1.076

-1.067

-1.171

Mean

0.00590

0.00505

0.00709

Standard Deviation

0.00765

0.00738

0.00799

Skewness

-0.523

-0.720

-0.412

Kurtosis

-0.327

0.367

-0.493

Mean

103.723

102.344

105.354

Standard Deviation

7.5607

7.053

7.855

Skewness

0.904

1.132

0.696

Kurtosis

-0.334

0.367

-0.836

Mean

0.000011

-0.000845

0.000112

Standard Deviation

0.000596

0.005621

0.000619

Skewness

-0.427

-1.726

0.609

Kurtosis

4.412

7.332

1.229

Mean

0.004030

0.003833

0.004260

Standard Deviation

0.001300

0.001192

0.001377

Skewness

0.674

0.750

0.536

Kurtosis

0.022

0.295

-0.248
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Thus, the multivariate normality assumption required by discriminant analysis is
violated.
Table 5.3 were developed for each group of months to explore whether differences
between months could be used to categorize a period as either bullish or as bearish.
As indicated above, the proposed theory predicts that as compared to bullish
market months, bearish market months have higher levels of G, ERNG, Cl, DTB,
PTB and lower levels of DS, and DP. The rest of the variables are insignificant. As
shown in Table 5.3. the means of eight independent variables generally exhibit such
relationships. As can be seen from Table 5.3, the univariate tests provide evidence
that the expected relationships do exist. For example, bullish market periods have
mean DTB of -.0010, which is lower than that of bearish market periods (.0010), and
mean DP of 3.4065, which is higher than that of bearish market periods (3.3698).
To examine the characteristics of the sample data further, the variance-covariance
matrices for both bullish periods and bearish periods are computed. These matrices
are presented in Table 5.4.
Tables 5.4, clearly shows that bullish and bearish market periods did not have
equal covariances during the test period.

Thus, both the multivariate normality

and equal covariances assumptions are violated by the sample data. Consequently,
discriminant analysis is not an appropriate statistical technical technique to use in
the construction of our timing model. It would be appropriate if its less restrictive
assumptions are met. However, logit analysis is still appropriate because it requires
less restrictive assumptions.

5.2

Construction of the Model

The initial base model is constructed on the basis of the 179 months from 2/62 to
12/76. This data base’s summary characteristics are described in the section above.

60

Table 5.3 Univariate Statistics Showing the Relationship

Variables

Expected Sign

Bearish
Mean

t-test
p-valuea

DS |

+

0.0087 |

0.0084

0.660

DP

+

3.4065

3.3698

0.649

EP |

+

0.0595

0.853

-0.0010

0.0016

0.024

0.0050

0.0069

0.105

102.3443 | 105.3537

0.008

-0.0001

0.0001

0.022

0.0038

0.0043

0.024

G
ERNG

l

Bullish
Mean

CI

- |
'
-

DTB
PTB
“two-sided tests

-

.0599 :

Table 5.4 Variance-Covariance Matrix for All Periods

DS
1.000

DS

DP

EP

DP

All
Bullish
Bearish

0.667
0.475
0.590

1.000

EP

All
Bullish
Bearish

0.811
0.698
0.765

0.927
0.909
0.918

1.000

G

All
Bullish
Bearish

0.508
0.492
0.488

—0.044
-0.012
-0.356

0.266
0.284
0.272

ERNG All
-0.536
Bullish -0.450
Bearish -0.496

-0.222
0.064
-0.094

Cl

All
Bullish
Bearish

DTB

All
-0.155
Bullish -0.023
Bearish -0.100

PTB

All
Bullish
Bearish

0.272
0.417
0.319

0.498
0.240
0.365

-0.026
0.103
0.268

G

-0.333 -0.455
-0.019 -0.130
-0.188 -0.277

1.000

0.610
0.662
0.645

0.082
0.342
0.230

0.273
0.407
0.063

0.649
0.551
0.592
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Cl

DT8

PTB

1.000

-0.413 -0.338
0.181
0.140
0.128 -0.074
-0.159 -0.120
0.088
0.562
0.568
0.547

ERNG

1.000

0.033
0.113
0.071 -0.007
0.084
0.027

0.456 -0.220
0.224
0.466
0.474
0.027

1.000

0.284 -0.271
0.042
0.312
0.322 -0.077

1.000

Based on these sample data, logit analysis results are contained in Table 5.5 and
Table 5.6.
Because model 2 was best in predicting the direction of the markets, this is the
model that is used in the subsequent simulation of actual investment policy.
Model 2 yields the following market timing prediction model:

Yi = F(Zi)
Zi=0.11
where:

(5.1)

- 646.32 x DTB - 433.83 x PTB + 0.58 x DP - 25.74 x ERNG

Y{

= conditional probability of bullish market periods

F(.) = the cumulative logistic probability distribution function

Z{ —

theoretical index

The overall significance level of the model 2 is 0.0026 indicating a good fit. Two
variables, changes in T-bill (DTB) and T-bill in previous month (PTB), are significant
at 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Two variables, dividend-price ratio (DP) and

growth rate in earnings (ERNG), are not significant at 10% level. However, the overall
accuracy rate drops from 64 % to approximately 62 % when these two variables are
not included in the model. Apparently these variables are contributing information
to the overall model even though these variables are found to be insignificant at the
.10 level.
The signs of the coefficients are consistent with the proposed theory. As suggested
by the proposed theory, DP has positive coefficient, DTB, PTB, and ERNG have neg¬
ative coefficients. Thus, our model and the proposed theory are mutually supportive.
The positive coefficient for the DP variable reveal that high dividend-price ratios sig¬
nal that future returns will be high because stocks are temporarily low. The negative
coefficient for the ERNG variable indicates that if earnings growth rate is too high,
the price may not be reflecting fundamental growth prospects and should be expected
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Table 5.5. Results from Logit Analysis

Model

1

2

3

4

5

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Constant

-.1914

.1087

4.1551

.0182

3.0242

(T-ratio)

(-.181)

(.099)

(1.383)

(.016)

(1.194)

DTB

-650.134

-646.324

-620.420

-643.114

-610.619

(T-ratio)

(-2.193)**°

(-2.155)**

(-2.101)**

(-2.146)**

(-2.048)**

PTB

-401.073

-433.828

-417.478

-427.871

-366.243

(T-ratio)

(-2.189)

(-2.828)***b

(-2.230)

(-2.767)***

(-2.252)**

BMA

-21.588

(T-ratio)

(-.355)

DP

.5886

.5808

.6288

.6634

.5184

(T-ratio)

(1.497)

(1.546)

(1.574)

(1.498)

(1.365)

G

-11.029

17.5226

(T-ratio)

(-.443)

(.561)

ERNG

-25.744

-30.515

-19.752

(T-ratio)

(-1.210)

(-1.211)

(-.910)

Cl

-.0290

(T-ratio)

(-1.275)

Chi-square

15.018

16.311

17.424

16.437

17.944

(Significance)

(.0047)

(.0026)

(.0038)

(.0057)

(.0030)

“** Significant at the 5 percent level.
6***Significant at the 1 percent level
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Table 5.6

1 Model

1 1

Actual Status

In-Sample Classification Results

No. of Cases

Predicted Status
Bullish

Bearish

Bullish

97

72

25

74.2 %

Bearish

82

41

41

50.0 %

Overall
2

63.1 %

Bullish

97

85

12

87.6 %

Bearish

82

51

31

37.8 %

Overall
3

64.8 %

Bullish

97

76

21

78.4 %

Bearish

82

43

39

47.6 %
64.2 %

Overall
4

Bullish

97

77

20

79.4 %

Bearish

82

48

34

41.5 %
62.0 %

Overall
5

Bullish

97

75

22

77.3 %

Bearish

82

41

41

50.0 %
64.7 %

Overall
6

Accuracy Rate

Bullish

97

76

21

78.4 %

Bearish

82

44

38

46.3 %
63.6 %

Overall
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to decline. The negative coefficients for the PTB (proxy for expected inflation) and
DTB (proxy for the changes in expected inflation) confirm that since the empirical
proxy for expected inflation is the Treasury-bill rate at the beginning of the period,
changes in stock prices could be associated with opposite changes in the proxy if real
interest rate changes are negatively correlated with stock returns.
The in-sample accuracy rates of the model 2 are 87.6% for bullish periods, 37.8%
for bearish periods.

This corresponds to the misclassification of 12 bullish periods,

51 bearish periods, respectively.3 Table 5.6 presents the details.
The overall accuracy rate of our model is computed as a weighted average of the
individual accuracy rates for bullish and bearish market periods. The weights used
are derived from the relative occurrence of bullish and bearish market periods, which
is 0.542 to 0.458.4

With this computation procedure, a classification that predicts

all periods as bullish has an overall accuracy rate of 54.2%.

Given that 54.2% of

all periods are bullish, our model’s 87.6% accuracy rate for predicting bullish is not
surprising. Predicting a relatively common occurrence (i.e. bullish periods) correctly
is more important than predicting a relatively rare occurrence (i.e. bearish periods)
correctly. Thus, this model of only four variables can be used to predict objectively
3Chua and Woodward [33] defined accuracy in a ex ante or ex post sense. In the ex ante sense, ac¬
curacy would be the probability of forecasting a bull/bear market with the market in the subsequent
period turning out to be bull/bear market. In the ex post sense, accuracy is the probability that the
market in a period has been observed to be bullish/bearish when the forecast for the period, made
at the beginning of the time interval, was bullish/bearish.

In an ex post performance evaluation

study, the question to be answered is how well a market-timing strategy would have done. We first
consider whether the market was bullish or bearish in a given period, then we check whether we had
forecast a bull or bear market for that period to determine what return would have earned. Chua
and Woodward [33], as well as Sharpe [141] and Jeffrey [89], analyzed the accuracy of a market
timer in what Chua and Woodward [33] call the ex post framework. We focus on the accuracy here
in the ex post sense. Chua and Woodward [33] concluded that a market timer must be correct in at
least 80 percent of all bull periods and 50 percent of all bear periods for market timing to pay with
annual timing. Droms [42] showed that a market timer must be correct in at least 60 percent of all
bull periods and 40 percent of all bear periods for market timing to pay with monthly timing.
4Sharpe [141] and Clarke et al [34] used .67 to .33 because Sharpe found that returns on stocks
exceeded returns on cash in 67% of his sample years 1934-1972.
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the probabilities of either a “bullish” or “bearish” market month.

The weighted

average accuracy rate of 64% also indicates the degree of fit of our model. The higher
the number of correct classifications the better the fit of our model. A accuracy rate
of greater than 50% indicates that the model performs better than naive approach
relying on chance.5
Note that the predictive accuracy of the models depend on the value of the cutoff
probability used.6 Presumably investors have attitudes toward risk which lead them
to to prefer different cutoff points.7 Thus results derived for a given cutoff probability
do not necessarily help them decide which model fits their needs. Clearly the rewards
or costs associated with the different types of correct or incorrect classifications de¬
termine the investor's optimal cutoff probability. This issue is further explored in the
next section.
Table 5.7 explaining the classificatory power of a model is quite different from the
table regularly used.
Column (1) lists the cutoff percentages used to classify a period as bullish or
bearish. The number of misclassified bullish is shown in column (2) (Type II error),
column (3) contains the number of misclassified bearish periods (Type I error), and
column (4) shows how many periods had calculated probabilities less than the cutoff
level. The number of correctly classified periods is given in column (5). The percent¬
age of periods correctly classified (column 6) is determined by dividing the number
in column (5) by the total number of periods in the test. Note that the maximum
5These results of our model predictions exceeded those achieved by the best naive model at the
0.01 significance level.
6 Logit analysis generates conditional probabilities but does not dictate what the cut-off probabil¬
ity between the groups(i.e., bullish and bearish market periods) should be. In contrast, discriminant
analysis computes an optimal Z-score to classify the observations into groups given the prior prob¬
abilities and sample data.
7The cutoff points represent a probability; for example, if the cutoff point was 0.20, a period with
a probability below that level would be classified as bearish (a 0); a probability above 0.20 would
be classified as bullish (a 1).
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Table -5.7 Classification Accuracy

Proposed
Cutoff

Predict-0
Actual-1

Predict-1
Actual-0

No. Below
Cutoff

No.
Correct

Percent
Correct

.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
.25
.30
.35
.40
.45
.46
.50

0
0
0

82
82
82
79

0
0
0
4
7
1

97
97
97

75
74
64
59
53
51
45

10
11
23
29
40

54.2
54.2
54.2
55.3
55.9
56.4
57.0
61.5
63.7
64.2
64.8 Ma
64.2 E=
62.0
60.3
54.2
53.6
48.0
47.5
46.4
46.4
45.8
45.8

-OO

.60
.65
o
r-t
.75
.80
.85
.90
.95
1.00

•>

2
o

3
0

6
11
12
19
35
49
67
87
91
94
96
96
97
97

43
56
84
109
134
163
171
176
178
178
179
179

OO
•JO

22
15
6
2
0
0
0
0
0

*M - Maximum Accuracy level
'P - Proportions* probability cutoff
CE - Equal probability cutoff

68

99
100
101
102
110
114
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116
115
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97
96
86
85
83
83
82
82
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accuracy level is a "data driven"7 cutoff point and it can vary based on changes in
the database. The 50 % cutoff assumed equal probabilities of groups; proportional
probabilities should also be considered.
Figure 5.1 depicts the frontier trading of one error against another, when the
errors are expressed as percentages. Figure 5.2 shows the mapping from cutoff points
to the two different types of errors.

The cutoff point which minimizes the sum of

errors is .46. At that point, 12.4% of the bullish periods and 62.2% bearish periods
axe misclassified. Note also that if we select a cutoff point equal to .10, then no Type
II error occurs and if we select a cutoff point equal to .80, then no Type I error occurs.
As discussed above, our model is very conservative in the sense that it attempts
to predict bullish periods correctly at the expense of bearish periods.

Recall that

their relative occurrence is 54.2 to 45.8. However, this conservative model may not
be optimal when the misclassification cost of predicting a bearish periods incorrectly
as a bullish periods (i.e., Type I error) is very much higher than the misclassification
cost of predicting bullish periods incorrectly els bearish periods (i.e., Type II error).
Under such circumstances, predicting a rare occurrence incorrectly is very costly and
thus, attempting to predict bullish periods correctly at the expense of bearish periods
may not be appropriate.
All the accuracy rates presented above are in-sample accuracy rates.

In other

words, the accuracy rates are computed on the basis of the estimation sample. Since
the same 179 periods are also used to construct our model, the in-sample accuracy
rates are upward biased.

Thus, the in-sample accuracy rates provide only a biased

indication of the predictive ability of our model.

Consequently, hold-out accuracy

rates need to be computed before the predictive ability of our model can be assessed.
The hold-out accuracy rates for our model, as computed using subsequent periods
and the Lachenbruch jackknife method, are presented in the next section.
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Figure 5.1 Tradeoff between Errors
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Figure 5.2 Frequency of Errors

CO
Vi

5.3

Lachenbruch Jackknife Method

To test the predictive power of our model in discriminating between bullish and
bearish market periods, the Lachenbruch jackknife method is used.8 The jackknife
technique avoids the problem of testing the model on the same data used to fit the
model. It is also distribution-free and does not require multivariate normality, equal
dispersion matrices.
The Lachenbruch method consists of the following steps. First, one sample period
among the 179 sample periods is held out and a logit model is constructed on the
remaining 178 sample periods. Second, the resulting logit model is used to compute
the conditional probability of bullish and bearish market periods for the held-out pe¬
riod. Third, the above procedure is repeated for every sample periods. For our model,
the Lachenbruch method generates 179 logit models and 179 conditional probabilities
since there are 179 sample observations. The means and standard deviation of the
179 sets of coefficients resulting from the Lachenbruch method are given in Table 5.8.
As expected, the means of the 179 sets of coefficient are close to the coefficients
in our model. Further, Table 5.8 shows that the logit coefficient resulting from the
Lachenbruch method are rather stable. This implies that our model is also a stable
timing prediction model. In particular, the coefficients of our model are not influenced
by any specific sample period.

Instead, they reflect the general characteristics of

bullish and bearish market periods.

5.4

Predictive Ability of Our Model

As discussed in the previous section, the in-sample accuracy rates of our model are
upward biased because the validation sample that is used to compute the in-sample
accuracy rates is also the estimation sample that is used to construct our model. Thus,
8P.A. Lachenbruch [105]

72

Table 5.8

Means and Standard Deviation of our Model

Coefficients

Mean

Standard Deviation

Constant

0.10862

0.08384

DTB

-647.962

23.0025

PTB

-434.195

13.2027

DP

0.58169

0.03139

ERNG

-25.690

1.6120
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to assess the predictive ability of our model in a more appropriate manner, an elevenyear (132-month) hold-out sample is evaluated.

Observations of each of the four

independent variables are taken from readily available published sources as previously
described and evaluated with prediction using logit equation.

The predictions are

generated as follows. We begin by building an initial base model using data from the
180 months from 1/62 to 12/76. Given these base model coefficients, we input actual
lagged data for 12/76 and generate probabilities of market risk environment for 1/77.
Subsequently, we input actual values for 1/77 and derive an probability of market
risk environment for 2/77. We do this for all twelve months in 1977. Then the base
model is updated twelve months (we drop the twelve months in 1962 and add the
1977 data). We then use this new base model to predict probabilities of market risk
environment for 1978.
Table 5.9 shows the results of our model during the hold-out sample period (19771987). These results indicate that our model is still statistically significant and main¬
tains a significance level of 1%. The coefficients remain reasonably stable, particularly
DTB and ERNG variable. The DTB and the PTB variable continue to be significant
at the 5% level or less during almost all periods. Interestingly, the DP variable and
the ERNG variable appears stronger and are now significant at the 5% level.
The resulting probabilities of each month are compared to the actual state of the
month to determine our model’s overall accuracy rate. The hold-out sample accuracy
rates of our model are 73.8% for bullish periods, 43.3% for bearish periods corre¬
sponding to the overall accuracy rate of 60.1%. Our model performed better than a
naive approach relying on chance. These results are similar to the in-sample results.
However, as expected, the hold-out accuracy rates are lower than the in-sample accu¬
racy rates since the latter are upward biased because the estimation sample is used to
validate the model. The relatively high number of correct classification in the holdout
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Table 5.5

Results from Logit Analysis during Hold-out Sample Period

Constant

DTB

PTB

DP

ERXG

Chi-square

Period

(T-ratio)

(T-ratio'

(T-ratio)

(T-ratio)

(T-ratio)

(Significance)

'53-77

1-8349

-758.301

-327.405

-.0377

-47.7622

17.368

(1.870)*°

(-2.465)* “

(-2.042)**

(-.123)

(-2.256)**

(.0016)

1.0592

-667.489

-331.454

.2013

-46.3444

15.580

(1.295)

(-2.270)**

(-1.981)**

(.814)

(-2.187)

(.0036)

-.3902

-569.843

-91.1316

.2987

-46.0593

12.167

(-.556)

(-2.034)**

--597'

(1.243)

(-2.229)**

(.0162)

-1.2499

-545.418

14.2720

.413664

-61.8932

19.282

(-1.782)*

(-2.388)’*

(.105)

(1.733)*

(-2.913)***

(.0007)

-.8288

-363.624

-150.556

.4766

-41.4571

12.200

(-1.212)

(-1.924)*

(-1.689)*

(2.109)**

(-2.136)**

(.0159)

-.6797

-313.774

-176.958

.4570

-40.9971

12.904

(-1.024)

(-1.801)*

(-1.994)**

(2.149)**

(-2.200)**

(.0118)

-1.0736

-306.543

-185.897

.5532

-43.9431

16.150

(-1.498)

(-1.751)*

(-2.094)**

(2.504)**

(-2.592)***

(.0028)

-.9879

-308.905

-171.742

.5180

-44.4255

16.480

(-1.290)

(-1.800)*

(-1.966)**

(2.254)**

(-2.765)***

(.0024)

-.9973

-363.925

-167.415

.5143

-41.482

16.330

(-1.267)

(-2.091)**

(-1.905)*

(2.208)**

(-2.556)**

(.0026)

-.3330

-340.902

-167.844

.4848

-43.716

16.287

(-1.032)

(-1.984)**

(-1.912)*

(2.095)**

(-2.752)***

(.0027)

-1.4462

-273.298

-134.430

.5733

-53.047

19.065

(-1.728)*

(-1.664)*

(-1.544)

(2.465)**

(-3.259)***

(.0008)

*54-'78
’55-79
:56-:80
’67-’81
'56-’82
:6$-:83
570-'84
’71-'85
572-:86
’73-587

!

a*SIgnificant at the 10 percent level
% "Significant at the 5 percent level
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sample period indicates that the probabilities generated by the logit model during
the within sample period could be considered as accurate probabilities for that time
period.

5.5

Consideration of Misclassification Costs

Logit analysis generates conditional probabilities but does not dictate what the
cut-off probability between the groups (i.e., bullish and bearish) should be. Therefore,
to use our model to predict the status of a period, a cut-off probability between
bullish and bearish must be determined. Bullish periods occur more frequently than
bearish periods. Therefore, Predicting the status of bullish periods correctly may be
more important than to predict the status of bearish periods correctly if we ignore
misclassification costs.9 Another justification for recommending a conservative timing
model is derived from previous research.10
Although our model is appropriate in general, less conservative prediction models
might also be used. In fact, less conservative models may be more appropriate when
the costs of mis classifying bearish periods as bullish periods (i.e., Type I errors) are
very much higher than the costs of misclassifying bullish periods as bearish periods
(i.e., Type II errors).

Under such circumstances, while bearish periods occur more

rarely, the misclassifications of these relatively rare occurrences are very costly.
Up to this point, misclassification costs have been ignored. When they are consid¬
ered explicitly, the procedure to be used to determine the optimal cut-off probability
differs significantly from that used so far.

Specifically, when misclassification costs

9To predict bearish periods correctly may be more important than to predict bullish periods if
the amount lost in the bearish periods is far greater than that made in a typical bullish period.
10Chua and Woodward [33], and Clarke et al [34] showed that accuracy in forecasting bull markets
is more important than accuracy in forecasting bear markets.

For example, eighty percent bull

market forecasting accuracy outperforms buying and holding regardless of bear market forecasting
ability without transaction costs. By comparison, seventy percent bear market forecasting accuracy
outperforms buying and holding only if bull market forecasting exceeds fifty percent.
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ire considered explicitly, the optimal cut-off probability for our model is no longer
:ha: probability that minimizes the misclassifications of bearish periods, given that
- -

Denods are classified correctly. Instead, the optimal cut-off probability is that

rrchahiliTy that minimizes the expected misclassification costs of using our model.
The expected misclassification costs of using our model can be expressed as follows:

EC

= [Pbr){Pi)(Ci) + (Pbl)(Eii)(Ch)

(5.2)

where EC = expected misclassification costs of using our model

Pbr — prior probability of bearish periods (0.458)

Pbl
Pj

= prior probability of bullish periods (0.542)

= conditional probability of Type I errors (no. of Type I errors 179)

Pil =
Cj =
Cii =

conditional probability of Type II errors (no. of Type II errors 179)
misclassification costs of a Type I error
misclassification costs of a Type II error

In the above formula, Cj and C/j are unknown parameters. Therefore, Cj and

Cn

can only be speculated to determine the optimal cut-off probability for our model.
Instead, the expected misclassification costs of using our model are computed under
alternative assumptions about the relative misclassification costs of Type I and Type
II errors (i.e.,

Ci : Cn).

This procedure is illustrated below.

Given the values of Pbr, Pbl>

EC =
where

N[ =

Pi,

an<^

Pih

EC can be expressed as follows.

(0.458)(Wj/179)(C/) + (0.542)(Af///179)(C/J)

number of Type I errors ;

Nu
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= number of Type II errors

(5.3)

That is,

(Nr

EC = 0.0025586 x

x

CT)

+ 0.0030279 x

(Nn

x

Cn)

The above formula shows that because bullish periods occur more frequently than
bearish periods, misclassifying bullish periods (i.e.,
misclassifying bearish periods (i.e.,
are ignored.

Ni)

Nn)

contributes more to EC than

when misclassification costs (i.e.,

Ci

and

Cn)

The different EC’s for our model under different cut-off probabilities

and optimal cut-off rate when

Cj

:

Cn

is 1:1 are presented in Table 5.10. This table

illustrates the determination of the optimal cut-off probability when

Ci : Cn

is 1:1.

As can be seen from Table 5.10, when the misclassification cost of a Type I error
is equal to the misclassification cost of a Type II error, the optimal cut-off probability
and the corresponding optimal cut-off standard deviate are .46 and
tively.

-.1603, respec¬

(These optimal cut-off values are identical to those specified by the model

in previous section.)

With this optimal cut-off probability, the expected misclassi¬

fication costs of using our model is .16731.11
higher EC’s when

Ci

:

Cn

is 1:1. Thus, when

in Table 5.10 is appropriate.

All other cut-off probabilities lead to

Ci

:

Cn

is 1:1, our model as specified

This specification of our model uses an optimal cut¬

off probability of .46 in its prediction rule. However, this specification of our model
may not be optimal for other values of Cj and

Cn.

In particular, different relative

misclassification costs may lead to different optimal cut-off values. Accordingly, the
optimal cut-off probabilities and expected misclassification costs for using our model
are computed for

Ci

:

Cn

ranging from 1:4 to 4:1.

The results are summarized in

Table 5.10.
11In this study, the expected misclassification costs of using our model are computed only for
the purpose of determining the optimal cut-off probability.

They do not have units and are not

interpretable unless actual values of Cj and C/j are used.

In other words, only when the actual

values of Ci and Cn including transaction costs are available, the actual expected misclassification
costs of using our model can be computed in terms of dollar amounts.
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Table 5.10' Summary of Optimal Cut-off Probabilities

Y

Z

Nt

Nn

EC

1 : 4

.10

-2.1972

82

0

.21074

1 : 3.5

.10

-2.1972

82

0

.21074

1 : 3

.40

-.4055

59

6

.20599

1 : 2.5

.40

-.4055

59

6

.19693

1 : 2

.40

-.4055

59

6

.18787

1 : 1.5

.40

-.4055

59

6

.17881

1 : 1

.46

-.1603

51

12

.16731

1.5: 1

.50

-.0009

45

19

.23085

2 : 1

.60

.4055

22

49

.26106

2.5: 1

.80

1.3863

0

94

.28388

3 : 1

.80

1.3863

0

94

.28388

3.5: 1

.80

1.3863

0

94

.28388

4 : 1

.80

1.3863

0

94

.28388

Ci

:

Cu

As can be seen from Table 5.10, our model is sensitive to varying relative misclassification costs for

Ci

:

Cu

ranging from 1:3 to 2:1, which is, optimal cut-off

probability (Y) for our model vary between .4 and .6. But, for
1:3.5, optimal cut-off probability remains at .1 and for
optimal probability remains at .8.
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Ci

:

Ci : Cu

Cu

ranging above

ranging below 2.5:1,

CHAPTER 6
CREATING A STRATEGY
AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The probabilities generated by the logit model are used to construct a portfolio
at the beginning of each month during the test period. The logit model used in our
study provides categorical information.

The probabilities produced are in relation

to “bullish” and “bearish” market periods. They are state probabilities and do not
specifically predict a return on the market or on the risk-free asset.

6.1

Asset Allocation Strategy

Five strategies, as presented in Table 6.1, is evaluated on the basis of their end of
period wealth.
Strategy 1 buys U.S. Treasury bills and represents the return on the risk-free asset
during the test period. Strategy 2 buys and hold the S & P 500 Index through the
entire period. S & P 500 Index is widely used despite its limitations as a proxy for
“THE” market. Buy-and-hold strategies are “do nothing” strategies: No matter what
happens to relative values, no rebalancing is required.

Buy-and-hold strategies are

easy to analyze. They also serve as anchor points for more complex approaches.
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Table 6.1

Strategies

Strategy 1; Buys U.S. Treasury bills and represents the return on the risk-free asset
during the test period.

Strategy 2; Buys and holds the S&P 500 Index through the entire period
Strategy 3; Switches between one hundred percent U.S. Treasury bills and one hun¬
dred percent equities (one hundred percent T-bills if bearish, one hundred per¬
cent equities if bullish).

Strategy 4; Manages portfolio according to the state probabilities generated by the
logit analysis. Comparison of Strategy 3 and Strategies 4 is to explore whether
allocating funds on the basis of probabilities is superior or if simple switching
policy is just as effective.

Strategy 5; Considers option-like payoff portfolio. For most investors, the achieve¬
ment of some guaranteed minimum return is the most important consideration;
for them, the mean-variance tradeoffs of MPT are insufficient for determin¬
ing appropriate asset allocations. To secure a minimum return while retaining
upside potential, option strategy is considered.
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Table 6.2

Asset Allocation of Strategy 4

Probabilities of

Percentage of Funds

A Bullish Month

Allocated to Equity

.65 - 1.00

100 (bullish)

.20 - .65

90 or 10 (neutral)

.00 - .20

0 (bearish)

Strategy 3 was to switch to one hundred percent equities whenever the logit model
signaled a “bullish” market month (probabilities greater than .46) and to move to one
hundred percent U.S. Treasury bills whenever the logit model signaled a “bearish”
upcoming market month (probabilities less than .46). Transaction costs for the timing
portfolio were the full two percent when moving into or out of equities.
Strategy 4 was based on the rationale that we should not attempt to make frequent
shifts in the portfolio asset mix based on modest change in probabilities. Those shifts
will add value only when we have a high degree of confidence because of the impact of
transaction costs. The asset allocation schedule ( Table 6.2 ) is proposed for investors
based on simulation results during in sample period.1
As we can see from the Figure 6.1, The probability range of .20 - .65 is termed the
“neutral market periods.” Probabilities in that range are too close to neutral to make
any reliable judgements about the outlook for the next month. If we were already
committed at the 100% level and the probability for the upcoming month was in the
neutral periods, it is assumed that we would move to 90% level for the upcoming
month rather than incur a transaction cost to move from the 100% level back to the
1This strategy is derived after a lot of trial and error.
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close to 0% level. If we were already committed at the 0% level and the probability
for the upcoming month was in the problem range, we would move to 10% level for
the upcoming month. If we were already committed at the 90% or 10% level and the
probability for the upcoming month was in the problem range, we would stay at the
present level for the upcoming month.2 During within sample period (1962-76), this
strategy signalled 61 switches between S

Sz

P 500 Index and T-bills (Figure 6.2).

Strategy 5 considers an option-like payoff portfolio.

For most investors, the

achievement of some guaranteed minimum return is also an important considera¬
tion.

To secure a minimum return while retaining upside potential, we consider a

stable mix strategy (40% equity and 60% T-bills).3 Strategy 2 does not always depict
the strategic choice a portfolio manager must make. We employ both buy and hold
S & P 500 Index and a stable asset mix index for comparison against the record of a
timing approach.

6.2

Results of the Allocation Strategies

Table 6.3 contains a summary of the performance results from investment using
predictions from our model.

Results are reported both with and without adjust¬

ments for commissions. Transaction costs are assumed to be two percent when mov¬
ing into or out of securities, which is obviously conservative in an era of negotiated
commissions.4 No commissions are assumed to be incurred on the purchase of T-bills
(i.e., acquisition at the original auction).5

Transaction costs are calculated on the

2 Strategy 4-1 is based on the probability range of .15 - .65 instead of .20 - .65
3Perold [122] has recently offered a portfolio insurance decision rule as Constant Proportion
Portfolio Insurance (CPPI). This strategy is basically, a special case of a more general set of policies
that also embrace the constant-mix. As pointed out by Perold and Sharpe [123], many investment
managers have been using it without knowing it.
4actual commissions would probably lower
5Sharpe [141] assumed a transaction cost of two percent. This may have been a realistic level
for individual investors in 1975, but is not representative of the transaction costs now incurred by
institutional investors. Wells Fargo’s market timing model charged .25 percent one way for changes
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1.0

Figure 6.1

Probabilities of Market Risk (In-Sample)
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1.0

Figure 6.2

Allocation of Funds (In-Sample)

percentage of funds allocated to stocks each month. When only a percentage of the
funds are allocated to stocks, the two percent transaction cost applied only to the
corresponding percentage of funds that are moved either into or out of stocks.
Strategy 3 (Switches between one hundred percent T-bills and one hundred percent
equities) has the highest growth rate during the test period without transaction costs.
With 2% transaction costs, strategy 4 has the highest growth rate.

The terminal

wealth attained by strategy 4 is 114% greater than that attained by strategy 2 ( Buy
and Hold S & P Index ) over the test period.6

Thus, we can see some advantages

to allocating funds in relation to the state probabilities generated by the logit model
when we assess the transaction costs. During the test period, strategy 3, 4, and 4-1
provide performance superior to strategy 1, and 2 with and without transaction costs.
To be valid a test of this (and any other predictive) model needs to evaluate
the model using data that were not included in the development of the model.
other words, the model should be confirmed with a holdout sample.

In

To test the

consistency, the rules derived from these periods are tested for the subsequent 132
months from 1/77 to 12/87. Table 6.4 shows the results of our model during hold out
sample period (1977-1987). These results are similar to the in-sample results. The
terminal wealth attained by strategy 4 is 25% greater than that attained by the B &:
H strategy.7 Strategy 3 outperformed the B & H strategy on a gross profit basis but
the terminal wealth attained by strategy 3 is 50% lower than that attained by the B
& H strategy on a net profit basis. These results confirm the idea that we should not
in the equity and bond portfolio based on its trading experience [Vandell and Stevens [158]]. Atchley
and Ehrhardt [4] also employed transactions costs of .25 percent. We also plan to compare results
with one and .25 percent transaction cost.
6The terminal wealth attained by strategy 4-1 is 57 % greater than that attained by strategy 2.
7As we can see from the Figure 6.4, the terminal wealth by strategy 4 is 3.8% greater than that
attained by B k H strategy until 1986 before the stock market crash. But the terminal wealth by
strategy 4-1 is consistently 20% greater than that attained by the B & H strategy even before the
stock market crash and its aftermath.
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Table 6.3

Summary of Results for Investment Analysis ( In-sample)

Commission

Strategy

Beginning Wealth

Ending Wealth

0 %

1

$ 10,000

$ 20,626

4.9448 %

S 27,847

7.0661 %

3

$ 77,688

21.1848 %

4

S 58,872

12.5453 %

4-1

S 43,678

10.3276 %

5

$ 25,775

6.5156

$ 20,626

4.9448 %

B & H

$ 27,574

6.9958 %

3

$ 51,560

11.5546 %

4

$ 53,684

11.8802 %

4-1

$ 40,583

9.7884 %

5

$ 25,623

6.4736 %

$ 20,626

4.9448 %

B & H

$ 27,301

6.9248 %

3

$ 34,077

4

$ 48,931

11.1661 %b

4-1

S 37,696

9.2496 %c

5

$ 25,470

6.4311 %

B

1 %

2 %

k

H

1

1

$ 10,000

$ 10,000

“number of transactions : 41
^number of transactions : 61
“number of transactions : 55
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Rate of Return

8.5169

%

%a

attempt to make frequent shifts in portfolio mix based on modest change in market
risk environment especially when we consider transaction costs. Those shift will add
value only when we have a high degree of confidence in our assessment of the risk
environment,

of the following periods. Figure 6.6 and 6.7 show probabilities of market

risk and allocations of funds during hold-out sample period (1977-1987), respectively.
Figure 6.3 illustrates investment results for six strategies in terms of the growth of a
dollar during 1/62-12/76. As the figure indicates, strategy 3, 4, and 4-1 outperformed
strategy 1, 2, and 5. Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5 show the hold-out results and whole
sample results.
As we mentioned in Chapter 4, we also test the model using OLS. The multiple
regression results are contained in Table 6.5. The overall results are generally accept¬
able, since all the

R2

are significant at the .01 level and the Durbin-Watson (D-W)

statistics that measure serial correlation in the residual are in the acceptable range.
We pick the following timing prediction model (Model 1):

ERi =

- 0.03 - 21.93 x DTB - 10.37 x PTB 4- .02 x DP - .57 x ERNG

Table 6.6 and 6.7 contains comparative results for a model based on probabilities
and a model based on OLS. The model using OLS has better performance than the
models using logit analysis and strategy 2 during the within sample period with 1%
transaction cost and without transaction costs while the model using logit analysis
has better performance than the model using OLS with 2% transaction costs. On the
other hand, that model using OLS has far worse performance than strategy 4 and
4-1 using logit analysis during hold out sample period with and without transaction
costs.

These results imply that investment timing may depend more on a proper

forecast of the direction than of the magnitude of risk environment and logit analysis
may be superior in generating probabilities of risk environment as compared to OLS.
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Table 6.4

Summary of Results for Investment Analysis(Hold-Out Sample)

Commission

Strategy

Beginning Wealth

Ending Wealth

0 %

1

$ 10,000

$ 25,278

8.7960 %

B & H

$ 38,369

13.0028 %

3

S 44,688

10.4959 %

4

$ 58,437

17.4083 %

4-1

S 53,620

16.4937 %

5

S 33,696

11.6765 %

$ 25,278

8.7960 %

B & H

$ 37,966

12.8944 %

3

$ 30,047

10.5189 %

4

$ 52,359

16.2419 %

4-1

S 49,211

15.5885

5

$ 33,488

11.6136 %

$ 25,278

8.7960 %

B & H

$ 37,562

12.7846 %

3

$ 20,123

6.5635 %“

4

$ 46,787

15.0590

4-1

$ 45,139

14.6845

5

$ 33,280

1 %

2 %

1

1

$ 10,000

$ 10,000

“number of transactions : 39
bnumber of transactions : 48
“number of transactions : 39
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Rate of Return

%

%b
%c

11.5504 %

Figure 6.3
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Probabilities of Market Risk (Hold-out Sample)
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Figure 6.7

Allocations of Funds (Hold-out Sample)

Table 6.5

OLS results

1

2

3

4

5

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Constant

-.0291

-.0027

-.0155

-.0363

-.0385

(T-ratio)

(-1.444)

(-.048)

(-1.101)

(-1.830)

(-.784)

DTB

-21.9347

-20.4895

-20.6762

-22.7763

-22.3903

(T-ratio)

(-4.236)***“

(-3.866)***

(-3.903)***

(-4.370)***

(-4.288)***

PTB

-10.3681

-12.5184

-10.8308

(T-ratio)

(-3.687)***

(-3.594)***

(-3.577)***

Model

BMA

2.8950

3.4681

(T-ratio)

(3.115)***

(2.484)**6

DP

.0228

.0264

.0240

(T-ratio)

(3.307)***

(3.554)***

(3.446)***

G

-1.2263

-1.3835

.4175

(T-ratio)

(-2.173)**

(-2.975)**

(.862)

ERNG

-.5718

(T-ratio)

(-1.427)

Cl

-.0002

.00003

(T-ratio)

(-.342)

(.078)

EP

-.1866

(T-ratio)

(-.554)

Adjusted
D-W

R2

.1749

.1423

.1433

.1688

.1653

2.0548

2.0457

2.0747

2.0586

2.0353

“’’’Significant at 1 percent level
b’’Significant at 5 percent level
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Table 6.6

Comparison between Logit analysis and OLS (In-Sample)

Commission

Strategy

0 %

B & H

1 %

2 %

Table 6.7

Beginning Wealth

Ending Wealth

Rate of Return

S 10,000

$ 27,847

7.0661 %

Logit 4

$ 58,872

12.5453 %

Logit 4-1

$ 43,678

10.3276 %

OLS

$ 66,753

13.4919 %

$ 27,574

6.9958 %

Logit 4

$ 53,684

11.8802 %

Logit 4-1

$ 40,583

9.7884 %

OLS

$ 59,793

12.6618 %

$ 27,301

6.9248 %

Logit 4

S 48,931

11.1661 %

Logit 4-1

S 37,696

9.2496 %

OLS

S 46,915

10.8547 %

B & H

B & H

Beginning Wealth

Ending Wealth

Rate of Return

$ 10,000

$ 38,369

13.0028 %

Logit 4

$ 58,437

17.4083 %

Logit 4-1

$ 53,620

16.4957 %

OLS

$ 49,810

15.7157 %

$ 37,966

12.8944 %

Logit 4

$ 52,359

16.2419 %

Logit 4-1

$ 49,211

15.5885 %

OLS

$ 39,860

13.3951 %

$ 37,562

12.7841 %

Logit 4

$ 46,787

15.0590 %

Logit 4-1

$ 45,139

14.6845 %

OLS

S 30,304

10.6045 %

Strategy

0 %

B & H

2 %

$ 10,000

Comparison between Logit analysis and OLS (Hold-Out Sample)

Commission

1 %

$ 10,000

B

B

k

k

H

H

$ 10,000

$ 10,000
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Performance of Model using Logit and OLS (In Sample)
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Figure 6.9

Performance of Model using Logit and OLS (Hold-Out Sample)

Figure 6.9 and Figure 6.9 show the performance of the model using logit analysis
and the model using OLS.
Table 6.8 contains a summary of the results for several strategies in terms of
monthly rates of return (arithmetic and geometric) and standard deviation of the
monthly returns when we assess 2% transactions costs.
These results strongly support our timing model (especially strategy 4) compared
to B & H strategy.

Not only is the monthly rate of return substantially higher

(i.e. .76% to 1.02% versus less than 0.26%), but the risk measured by the standard
deviation is higher for the B & H strategy than for timing models (strategy 4 and
4-1). This result occurred because timing models evidently avoided a number of the
adverse impact of major market declines by switching into T-bills. The comparison
between strategy 5 and strategy 4 is less clear. These results indicate higher rate of
return for the strategy 4 (0.69% to 1.02% versus less than 0.33%), but the standard
deviation for strategy is much lower.
A more relevant way of comparing risk is to look at total performance over a
cycle. Figure 6.10 and

6.11 show the one-year moving (annualized) performance of

our model relative to the B & H strategy and strategy 5. Strategy 4 didn’t have a
worse performance than the B & H strategy except 1985-1986. Especially in the poor
market years, strategy 4 was distinctly better than the B & H strategy. Figure 6.12
and 6.13 produce the yearly performance characteristic line for strategy 4 against the
B

H strategy and strategy 5. The portfolio beta of 0.659 indicates a moderately less

risky portfolio than the market. The alpha of 0.076 per year is statistically significant
at the .01 level. Figure 6.12 shows a tendency for strategy 4 to do well in bad markets
and to match the B & H strategy in good markets. Figure 6.13 shows that strategy
4 outperforms strategy 5 in both strong and weak markets.
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Table 6.8

Period

Strategy

'62-587

1
2
3
4
4-1
5
1
2
3
4
4-i
5
1
2
3
4
4-1
5

’62-76

77-’87

Average Monthly Return and Standard Deviation

Arithmetic Mean

Standard Deviation

0.24
4.57
3.51
3.42
3.81
2.74
0.13
4.42
3.72
3.39
3.68
2.64
0.24
4.75
3.20
3.45
3.96
2.84

0.53 %
0.86 %
0.69 %
1.08 %
0.99 %
0.73 %
0.41 %
0.66 %
0.76 %
0.95 %
0.81 %
0.56 %
0.71 %
1.14 %
0.60 %
1.25 %
1.24 %
0.97 %
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%
%
%

%
%
%
%

%
%
%
%
%
%

%
%

%
%
%

Geometric Mean

0.53
0.76
0.63
1.02
0.92
0.69
0.41
0.56
0.69
0.95
0.74
0.52
0.71
1.01
0.53
1.18
1.15
0.92

%
%

%
%
%

%
%
%
%
%
%
% j:

%
%
%
%
%
%

(i

ID

a
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Figure 6.11

Moving Annual Return (Hold-out Sample Period)
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Table 6.9

Results without 1979-1981

Beginning Wealth

Ending Wealth

Rate of Return

’62 - 78

B & H

S 10,000

$ 26,977

6.0114 %

4

48,355

9.7111 %

B & H

9,673

-.0165

4

9,711

-.0145 %

B & H

25,096

10.7645

4

27,414

11.8571

B & H

26,474

17.6170 % |

4

28,230

18.8827

H

69,990

14.9105 %

4

136,449

-4

oo

-3
1

oo

Strategy

i.
t-

Period

’82 - 587
’62 - ’87

B

k

Strategy 4 has better performance than B
the typical down markets (1979-1981) with

2%

20.5228

%
%
%
%
%

H strategy even when we ignore the
transactions costs. Table 6.9 shows

these results.
We compared portfolio performance in up and down markets to check whether
our model works through the cycle. Table 6.10, and Figure 6.14,

6.15,

6.16 show

these comparison. Strategy 4 did comparatively well relative to the B & H strategy
in down markets. Strategy 4 did better than the strategy 1 in up markets. It nearly
matched the B & H strategy under those circumstances. This results show that our
model can reduce downside risk and improve average performance over a cycle.
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Table 6.10

Performance Results in Up and Down Markets

Period

Strategy 1

B

&:

H Strategy

Strategy 3

Strategy 4

Strategy 5

Up Markets
8/63-2/65

3.28 %

19.62 %

19.62 %

17.80 %

12.86 %

10/66-11/68

4.73 %

21.34 %

16.06 %

18.33 %

14.59 %

7/70-4/71

3.57 %

37.83 %

37.83 %

35.43 %

23.14 %

10/74-12/76

5.64 %

35.62 %

33.23 %

33.18

%

23.22 %

3/78-11/80

9.62 %

25.43 %

11.84 %

26.61 %

19.21 %

8/82-11/83

8.48 %

46.17 %

30.69 %

41.14

%

30.13 %

6/84-3/86

8.37 %

34.41 %

6.59 %

22.92 %

23.59 %

Compound Average

6.69 %

31.02 %

20.89 %

27.72 %

20.99 %

2/62-7/63

2.80 %

2.36 %

2.36 %

1.28 %

2.89 %

3/65-9/66

4.29 %

-5.13 %

-5.46 %

-4.22 %

-1.34 %

12/68-6/70

6.64 %

-19.62 %

-21.99 %

-17.20 %

-9.68 %

5/71-9/74

5.23 %

-13.90 %

-13.90 %

-13.58 %

-6.54 %

1/77-2/78

5.23 %

-13.90 %

-13.90

-13.58 %

-6.54 %

%

7.60 %

10.55 %

-1.21 %

Down Markets

-10.52

12/80-7/82

14.00 %

12/83-5/84

9.42 %

-14.28 %

9.42 %

-12.11 %

5.35 %

4/86-12/87

5.65 %

5.21 %

-4.20 %

5.18 %

6.26 %

Compound Average

6.86 %

-8.64 %

-3.92 %

-2.29 %

-3.35 %

Figure 6.14

Comparison of Performances in Up and Down Markets
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Much of previous research in finance has concentrated on explaining movements
of individual securities rather than on explaining movements in the stock market as a
whole. Although the available data are limited, the movements in the stock market as
a whole are extremely important for movements in individual stocks. Indeed, market
events of the past ten years have sparked an interest in tactical asset allocation. The
turbulence of October 1987 (the disappointing results of portfolio insurance during
the Oct. 19, 1987 market crash and the awareness that asset allocation adds value)
has only accelerated this interest.
A review of the related literature showed that the returns on the market timer’s
portfolio increases as the level of information increases and that even a modest amount
of information can bring substantial advantage.
This study seeks to develop a methodology that systematically incorporates cur¬
rently available information into the tactical asset allocation process. The goal is not
to predict individual stock prices, or every small movement in the market. Rather
we would like to use the currently available data to provide the investor with an
estimate of the probabilities associated with the broad measure of either a “bullish5'
or “bearish” market period. Our study focused on how state probabilities could be
generated from the appropriate variables based on theory and utilized in the asset al111

location process. This procedure was evaluated to determine if portfolio performance
was improved over a buy-and-hold strategy.

7.1

Methodology
The methodology employed in our study was a three step procedure.

The first

step is to find ex ante observable variables which can predict the excess return. The
second step involved the generation of state probabilities from a logit analysis of the
sample data.

Appropriate variables based on theory were collected over a 15-year

time period and used in the development of a logit model for predicting “bullish” and
“bearish” stock market months. The data were collected with regard to publication
lag time to ensure that the data would have been available to the investor at the
beginning of each month. The 180 months were classified as either “bullish” (total
return on stock, including dividends, exceeded the return on Treasury Bills) or as a
“bearish” (inverse of a “bullish” market month) months. A dichotomous logit analysis
using a “0,1” (0 = “bearish”, 1 = “bullish”) coded dependent variable was used to
analyze the 15-year period.

A significant logit model was developed from the data

relating to the 15-year within sample period. The model was verified with a 11-year
holdout sample.
The third step of the procedure used the probabilities generated by the logit
model to suggest the optimum allocation of funds between two asset classes; a market
portfolio and a risk free asset. The surrogate for the market portfolio was the S
P 500 Index.

The risk-free asset was represented by U.S. Treasury bills.

An asset

allocation schedule was developed based on the probabilities assigned by the logit
model. For comparison purposes, several strategies were evaluated.
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7.2

Findings

The logit analysis of the sample data produced a statistically significant model
for predicting

bullish’' and “bearish” stock market months.

The model correctly

classified 116 out of the 179 months of the within sample period. The implication of
a statistically significant model is that the appropriate variables based on theory for
the within sample period could have been used to objectively predict the probabilities
of “bullish” and “bearish” market months. The model was verified with a 11-year
holdout sample period.
During the within sample period, An asset allocation procedure based on the
probabilities generated by the verified logit model has shown better performance
than buy-and-hold S & P 500 Index strategy even when we assess 2% transactions
costs. These results were confirmed with a holdout sample. Not only is the monthly
rate of return sub st anti all y higher, but the risk measured by the standard deviation
is higher for B & H strategy than for timing models. This result occurred because
timing models avoided a number of the adverse impact of major market declines by
switching into T-bills. We also find that timing models did comparatively well relative
to the B &: H strategy in down markets and nearly matched the B & H strategy in up
markets. These results showed that our model can reduce downside risk and improve
average performance over a cycle.

7.3

Conclusion

Our results have a number of implications for investing and portfolio management.
First, this study suggest some possibilities that portfolio performance can be im¬
proved by successful market timing model. When viewed over time, risks were con¬
trolled and returns were enhanced. By timing the extreme markets, lost opportunities
for gains in bullish markets were more than made up when dramatic downturns oc-
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curred. This result also confirm other studies that a market timer who follows optimal
rules can expect higher return and lower risk than a buy-and-hold investor. The re¬
sults obtained during hold-out sample period (1977-1987) did not differ significantly
from the results based on a 15-year in sample period (1962-1976). Thus the benefits
derived from our timing model appear to be robust-at least in the kind of economic
environment that characterized the last 30-year in the United States.
Second, this study shows that readily available information can be used to aid
the investment manager in assigning probabilities to the future states of the stock
market. Those probabilities can be effectively used in the asset allocation decision
process.
Third, our analysis highlights the importance of transaction costs.

Our results

confirm the idea that we should not attempt to make frequent shifts in portfolio mix
based on modest change in market risk environment. Those shift will add value only
when we have a high degree of confidence in our assessment of the risk environment.
Our analysis using monthly data also point out some possibility that shortening
the time horizon for timing decision is advantageous. Performance improves as the
relative volatility of the market return increases - that is, as the length of the timing
horizon is decreased.

But, this effect is limited by several practical considerations.

The accuracy of predictions is likely to decrease as the time horizon is shortened.1
Transactions costs definitely will increase as the length of the time horizon decreases
and thus the number of transactions increases. Both of these influences will limit the
extent to which shortening the time horizon for timing decision is advantageous.
Since our model is basically a market timing prediction model, the primary use is
to aid investment managers in asset allocation decision. Our model is both inexpen1This contention is based on the view that the accuracy of any prediction is reduced by the
occurrence of unpredictable random events. If these random events are unrelated, then they will
tend to offset each other over time. Therefore, we might expect their reduction of the accuracy of
prediction to be smaller, the longer the time horizon over which the prediction is made.
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sive and easy to use. Input to our model can be obtained readily from public sources
and classification can be made simply by calculating the probability of bullish (or
bearish) market months with the model coefficients and comparing it to the optimal
cutoff probability. Our model is also objective and unambiguous. It does not depend
on subjective judgement, the probability of bullish market months is determined sta¬
tistically, and the prediction rule is clear.

Although we can really identify optimal

cutoff probabilities to minimize the expected costs only when the actual misclassification costs are available, the relatively high number of correct classification in the
holdout sample indicates that the probabilities generated by the logit model during
the within sample could be considered as accurate probabilities.
This study is simplified in several ways. First, it includes only two types of assets;
stocks and Treasury bills ignoring all other assets such as bond and real estate. This
concept can also be extended to another asset classes.
Second, one question that arises naturally in a study such as this is whether addi¬
tional ex ante variables have predictive ability. We have chosen to define this study by
restricting the number of ex ante variables, but the investigation could be extended
across a range of ex ante variables as well. The lag time of the various independent
variable observations could also be varied extensively in hopes of obtaining a stronger
predictive model.
Third, the linear relationship may not be optimal. A fundamental and widespread
economic change should affect the structural relationships in the market. The struc¬
tural relationships between securities are almost certainly not constant.
Further studies should include a variation on the time intervals applied in this
study. For example, weekly variables could be compared to a weekly return on the
market portfolio. An asset allocation strategy could then be tested to learn if value
is likely to be created from a weekly adjustment of a portfolio. Another alternative
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would be to sample quarterly or yearly data based on the premise of adjusting the
portfolio quarterly or annually. Also, many different variations of the asset allocation
strategy could be evaluated to achieve the ultimate value from the logit probabilities.
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